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1. The Evolving Agenda
If you were to browse among leading journals in environmental and resource economics, you would
discover that a recurrent activity in the field has been to devise ways of valuing the constituents of Nature
(Freeman III, 1993). A question that would occur to you is, why? Why should there be a special need to
determine the worth of Earth's various resources? Why not rely on market prices?
The answer is that for many natural resources markets simply do not exist. In some cases they don't
exist because the costs of negotiation and monitoring are too high, two broad categories being economic
activities that are affected by ecological pathways involving long geographical distances (e.g., the effects of
upstream deforestation on downstream activities many miles away) and those involving large temporal
distances (e.g., the effect of carbon emission on climate, in a world where forward markets don't exist,
because future generations are not present today to negotiate with us). Then there are natural assets (the
atmosphere, aquifers, the open seas) for which the nature of the physical system (the migratory nature of the
components of the assets) is such as to make it very difficult to define, let alone to enforce, property rights;
a fact that keeps markets for such assets from existing. Ill-specified or unprotected property rights can also
prevent markets from being formed (as is the case frequently with mangroves and coral reefs), while non-
convexities in transformation possibilities among ecological goods and services would make markets
function wrongly even if they were to form. In short, markets on their own aren't an adequate set of
institutions for our relationships with Nature.
1.1 Institutional Externalities
We call those effects of human activities that occur without mutual agreement, externalities.
Understandably, the study of externalities has greatly influenced the development of environmental and
resource economics. Meade (1973), Mäler (1974), Baumol and Oates (1975), and Sandmo (2000) are book
length accounts. However, these authors have shown that externalities are "epi-phenomena": they are not the
real thing, but only manifestations of the real thing. Despite this commonly acknowledged insight, it is not
uncommon to be told today that environmental and resource economics involves not much more than a study
of externalities; which is rather like being told that the economics of asymmetric information involves not
much more than a study of externalities. In fact, neither is to be told much. Interest in either subject arises
when we ask why there are externalities and what forms they are likely to assume in various circumstances.
It is useful to classify externalities into two broad categories: unidirectional and reciprocal
(Dasgupta, 1982). Damage inflicted by upstream deforestation on downstream farmers without compensation
(Hodgson and Dixon, 1992), the acid rains that are inflicted on a region by another that is upwind (Mäler,
1989; Mäler and de Zeeuw, 1998), and the spread of contagious diseases from infected to susceptible humans
(Anderson and May, 1991; Ferguson et al., 1997) are examples of the former; while the famous "tragedy of
the commons" (Hardin, 1968) has become a metaphor for the latter. Excessive emissions into the atmosphere
of carbon dioxide and the nitrogen oxides from industrial activity and modern transportation are examples
of the tragedy; as is the reduced capacity for nitrogen fixation owing to changing land use (Steffen et al.,
2004). Other instances where the tragedy occurs include unregulated fishing and groundwater withdrawal
when there is free access to them.
1another on the effects on groundwater. For over four decades, the Prisoners' Dilemma game has
been used by economists to show that a resource would be over-used under open access, but it was
Hardin (1968) who popularised it by means of his admirable metaphor.
     
2 For a good illustration of the conflicting intuitions, see the debate between Norman Myers and
the late Julian Simon in Myers and Simon (1994).
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Economists have traditionally viewed externalities as symptoms of market failure. In consequence,
estimating people's valuation of non-marketed Nature's goods and services and determining optimal public
instruments for the preservation of amenities, the control of pollution, and the extraction of natural resources
in the face of market failure have been the broad subjects of enquiry in environmental and resource
economics. Several previous surveys of the subject have reflected those preoccupations admirably (Fisher
and Peterson, 1976, Cropper and Oates, 1992, Copeland and Taylor, 2004, on environmental pollution; and
Brown, 2000, on renewable resources).
It has been appreciated for a long time, though, that non-market institutions (e.g., communities)
frequently emerge in situations where markets either do not function well, or, in the extreme, do not exist.
It has also long been appreciated that markets would not be able to operate extensively in the absence of a
well-functioning State. But just as markets can malfunction, so can non-market institutions (including the
State!) falter. An implication of the way we have defined externalities here is that they reflect institutional
failure. One may say that environmental and resource problems are often symptoms of institutional failure,
of which market failure is but one class of examples.
1.2 A Question and A Puzzle
With this background understanding, a question arises: In view of our dependence on the
environment and natural resources, is contemporary economic development sustainable?
There is a remarkable divergence of opinion on the question, ranging from a straightforward "yes"
to a flat "no". There is also the opinion that the question misleads, in that it is so aggregative as to suggest
that environmental and (natural) resource conflicts are to be found only between "us" and a sequence of
future "thems"; whereas, or so it is argued, large pockets of extreme poverty residing in what is otherwise
an increasingly affluent world ensure that there are such conflicts even among contemporaries.
The environmental and resource problems facing a society are a function of its demand for goods
and services. Population size contributes to that demand, but the average demand per person contributes to
it too. Some people have argued that per capita consumption in industrialized nations have reached levels
that are socially very costly and irresponsible, while others have claimed that high per capita consumption
is essential if prosperity there is to be maintained and if poor countries are to prosper.
Underlying these intellectual tensions are the conflicting intuitions that have arisen from different
empirical perspectives on whether the character of contemporary economic development, both in the poor
world and in industrialized countries, is sustainable.
2 On the one hand, if we look at specific resources and
services (fresh water, a wide variety of ecosystem services, and the atmosphere as a carbon sink), there is
convincing evidence that continued growth in the rates at which they are utilized is unsustainable (Vitousek
et al., 1986, 1997; Postel et al., 1996; Bolin, 2003; Steffen et al., 2004). For example, Vitousek et al. (1986)
estimated that something like 40 percent of the net energy created by terrestrial photosynthesis (i.e., net
primary production of the biosphere) is currently being appropriated for human use. This is of course a     
3 This was the theme of a special symposium in Science, 1997, Vol. 277 (see especially the
article by Vitousek et al.). See also McNeill (2000) for global statistics on changes in the magnitude
of the perturbations that were made to the natural environment during the 20th century.
     
4 HDI is a suitably normalised, linear combination of GNP per head, life expectancy at birth, and
literacy (UNDP, 1990).
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rough-and-ready figure; moreover, net terrestrial primary production isn't given and fixed: it depends in part
on human activity. Nevertheless, the estimate does put the scale of the human presence on Earth in
perspective. The figures also give us an idea of the unprecedented perturbation to the natural environment
that has been created by human activity in a short space of time.
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On the other hand, if we study historical trends in the prices of marketed resources (e.g., minerals
and ores), or the recorded growth in the conventionally measured indices of economic progress (such as gross
national product (GNP) per head) in those countries that are today rich, environmental and resource scarcities
would not appear yet to have bitten (Barnett and Morse, 1963; Simon, 1990; Johnson, 2000). World GNP
per capita has grown three-fold (to over 5,000 US dollars) since the end of the Second World War; humans
on average live some 20 years longer; and we are far better educated.
The new developments in environmental and resource economics we survey in this paper were a
response to these conflicting intuitions. One of the achievements of that programme of research has been to
establish that that particular disagreement can be resolved by abandoning indices of economic welfare that
cover just the short run, such as GNP per head and the United Nations' Human Development Index (HDI)
4,
and by adopting instead an inclusive measure of wealth (Sections 6-8). GNP per head (or, for that matter,
HDI) can increase during an extended period, even while wealth per head declines. Studying trends in GNP
per head, or HDI, can be misleading in regard to the economic prospects that may lie ahead. They could also
mislead if we were to assess the past economic performances of nations solely in their terms (Section 6).
1.3 Resources and Pollutants
Natural resources are of direct use in consumption (fisheries), of indirect use as inputs in production
(oil and natural gas), and of use in both (air and water). It may be that the value of a resource is derived from
its usefulness (as a source of food, or as essential actors in enabling ecosystems to provide services - e.g., as
keystone species), it may be that the value is aesthetic (places of scenic beauty), or it may be that it is intrinsic
(primates, blue whales). In fact, the value may involve all three considerations (biodiversity). The worth of
a resource could be from the value of what is extracted from it (timber), or from its presence as a stock (forest
cover), or from both (watersheds).
Interpreting natural resources in a broad way, as we are doing here, enables us to include on our list
those assets that provide the many and varied ecosystem services upon which life is based. Those services
include maintaining a genetic library, preserving and regenerating soil, fixing nitrogen and carbon, recycling
nutrients, controlling floods, filtering pollutants, assimilating waste, pollinating crops, operating the
hydrological cycle, and maintaining the gaseous composition of the atmosphere. A number have a global
reach, but many are local. Nature's services are not only of direct value to us, they offer indirect benefits too:
a multitude support and promote the natural resource base on which our economic activities are founded.
Thus, for example, mangrove forests are not only sources of timber, but are also nursaries for wide varieties
of fish populations. Moreover, they protect coastlines from storms, provide nutrients for aquatic life, and     
5 Dasgupta (1982) develops the perspective in greater detail. See Heal (2000) for an application
of the viewpoint to a watershed management problem in the Catskill Mountains in the state of New
York.
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assimilate organic wastes that human populations deposit into the sea. (Naylor and Drew, 1998, show how
one can elicit information concerning the value of a mangrove forest to those who are dependent on it.)
Ecosystems have close similarities with the interdependent economic systems that we economists
study in the special circumstances of a general equilibrium: individual actors (whether organic or inorganic)
interact with one another and generate ecosystem services (Mäler, 1974). Those interactions in the main
involve non-linear dynamic processes. In Section 5 we illustrate by means of a simple model how such
dynamic processes determine economic possibilities. Ehrlich et al. (1977), Daily (1997), Ehrlich and Ehrlich
(1997), Levin (1999, 2001), Press et al. (2001), Gunderson and Holling (2002), and Steffen et al. (2004)
contain extensive, authoritative accounts of the processes that yield Nature's services.
Pollutants are the reverse of natural resources. In some cases the emission of pollutants amounts
directly to a degradation of ecosystems (the effect of acid rains on forests); while, in others, it means a
reduction in environmental quality (deterioration of water quality), which also amounts to degradation of
ecosystems (watersheds). Therefore, for analytical purposes, there is no reason to distinguish resource
economics from environmental economics, or resource management problems from environmental
management problems. Roughly speaking, "resources" are "goods" (in many situations they are the sinks into
which pollutants are discharged), while "pollutants" (the degrader of resources) are "bads". If, over an
extended period of time, the discharge of pollutants into an environmental sink exceeds the latter's
assimilative capacity, the sink is destroyed (Section 5). Pollution is thus the reverse of conservation.
5 In what
follows, the terms natural resources and the environment are used interchangebly.
1.4 Rural Poverty and the Local Resource Base
The above, expansive reading of the traditional terms externalities, resources, and environment has
been invoked by a few economists in recent years to extend the reach of environmental and resource
economics by investigating the numerous roles Nature plays in the lives of rural people in the world's poorest
countries. This has led to the study of institutions that were created by the rural people to manage natural
resources. (The focus on rural, as opposed to urban, poverty is understandable: some 60-70 percent of people
in the world's poorest countries live in rural areas.) In studying Nature's roles in rural life and the rural
institutions that have emerged to better meet those roles, investigators have drawn attention to local resource
bases, which comprise such assets as ponds and streams, water holes and aquifers, swidden fallows and
threshing grounds, woodlands and forests, grazing lands and village tanks, and fisheries and wetlands. They
are for the most part common property and are frequently managed by communitarian institutions. Attempts
have been made to uncover the pathways by which poverty and reproductive behaviour among rural people
is linked to the state of their local resource base (Dasgupta, 1982, 1993, 2003a, 2004; Dasgupta and Mäler,
1991, 1995). Although the economics of development and environmental and resource economics have
traditionally remained silent about each other (see, for example, the survey articles by Stern, 1989, on
development economics; and by Cropper and Oates, 1992, and Brown, 2000, on environmental and resource
economics, respectively), they are in fact closely related. You would not obtain a clear picture of rural life
in the world's poorest regions if you were to neglect the direct role the local resource base plays there. And     
6 For empirical confirmation of the links between resource degradation and the persistence of
poverty, see Agarwal (1986), Cleaver and Schreiber (1994), Baland and Platteau (1997), Barbier
(1997, 1999), Chopra and Gulati (1998), Aggarwal et al. (2001), Campbell et al. (2001), and Jodha
(2001), among many others.
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you would be unable to track the evolution of local resource bases in the world's poorest regions if you were
to neglect the needs of the poor and the local institutions they managed to create in order to cope with those
needs. We economists should not have expected matters to have been otherwise.
The study of local economies has drawn attention to the fact that, what counts in the ecology of rural
life are populations of species: "species" per se is too broad a category. Thus, when wetlands, inland and
coastal fisheries, woodlands, forests, ponds and lakes, and grazing fields are damaged (owing, say, to
agricultural encroachment, or urban extensions, or the construction of large dams, or organizational failure
at the village level, or resource usurpation by the State), traditional dwellers suffer. For them - and they are
among the poorest in society - there are frequently no alternative source of livelihood, nor is migration
usually an option. In contrast, for rich eco-tourists or importers of primary products, there is something else,
often somewhere else, which means that there are alternatives. Whether there are substitutes for a particular
resource is therefore not only a matter concerning technology and consumer preferences: the poor suffer from
a lack of substitution possibilities in ways the rich don't.
6 Even the range between a need and a luxury is
context-ridden. For these reasons environmental and resource economics needs not only to be inclusive in
its recognition of what constitutes a capital asset, it needs also to be sensitive to individual and locational
differences. A pond in one village is a different asset from a pond in another village, in part because their
ecological characteristics differ, but in part also because the communities making use of them face different
economic circumstances. In practice, of course, such refined distinctions may not be realizable in national
income accounts; but it is always salutary to be reminded that macroeconomic reasoning glosses over the
heterogeneity of Earth's resources and the diverse uses to which they are put - by people residing at the site
and by those elsewhere. National income accounts reflect that reasoning by failing to record a wide array of
our transactions with Nature.
1.5 Nature's Non-Convexities and Policy Failure
Earlier, we traced environmental and resource problems to institutional failure. But they can arise
also from policy failure.
The catalogue of policy failures round the world that has been compiled over the years is long and
varied. Some are reflections of corruption, vested interests, or sheer ineptitude; but there are examples of
policy failure that can be interpreted as being inadvertent. For example, in an analysis of deforestation in the
Brazilian Amazon, Alston et al. (1999) have argued that accelerated deforestation, followed by violent
conflicts between landowners and squatters, has occurred because of legal inconsistencies between the civil
law, which supports the title held by landowners, and the constitutional law, which supports the right of
squatters to claim land not in "beneficial use" (e.g., farming or ranching). Ironically, the latter right reflects
the government's stated desire for land reform. The authors have shown that the vagueness of the "use"-
criteria and the uncertainty as to when a land owner's claim to a piece of land or a squatter's counter claim     
7 In a wider discussion of the conversion of forests into ranches in the Amazon basin, Schneider
(1995) has shown that the construction of roads through the forests has also been a potent force.
Other examples of policy-induced environmental deterioration are the massive agricultural subsidies
in the European Union. These are known to have encouraged agricultural practices harmful to
aquatic ecosystems.
     
8 For completeness, here is the definition of convexity of a set:
A commodity vector, say z, is a convex combination of commodity vectors x and y if z is
a weighted average of x and y, where the weights are non-negative and sum to unity (that is, z =
 x + (1- )y for some     [0,1]). A set of commodity vectors is said to be convex if every convex
combination of every pair of commodity vectors in the set is in the set. A set is non-convex if it is
not convex.
     
9 Dasgupta and Mäler (2004) is a collection of technical articles on the economics of non-convex
ecosystems.
     
10 See Dasgupta (1993) for the relationship between nutritional status and human productivity,
and for evidence on synergies between nutritional and disease status. An extensive set of references
to the primary literature on these topics is also provided there.
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to it is enforced are together an explosive force.
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The political economy underlying policy failure has been much studied by economists, international
agencies, and non-governmental organizations. By way of offering a contrast, we focus here on policy
failures arising from the application of incorrect models of ecosystems. Theoretical studies on the optimum
extraction of renewable resources and the policies that flow from them frequently assume that transformation
possibilities among goods and services constitute convex sets. Convexity is a mathematically convenient
assumption.
8 However, a large body of empirical studies by earth scientists has revealed that the pathways
by which the constituents of ecosystems interact with one another and with the external environment
frequently involve positive feedback. (See Steffen et al., 2004, for an illuminating set of studies.) The
findings imply that the transformation possibilities among environmental goods and services, taken together,
constitute non-convex sets. Nature's non-convexities are in many cases so significant, that to assume
convexity there, even as an approximation, would be misleading (Section 5). For this reason, mathematical
ecologists have studied the structural stability of ecosystems and the sizes and shapes of their basins of
attraction for given sets of environmental parameters (May, 1977; Murray, 1993). Such notions as the
resilience of ecosystems to withstand perturbations without siginificant changes in their character are
expressions of this research interest (Perrings et al., 1995; Levin et al., 1998; Gunderson and Holling, 2002).
9
Although non-convexities are prevalent in global ecosystems (ocean circulation, global climate), it
is as well to emphasise the spatial character of many positive feedback processes. The latter have a direct
bearing on rural people in the world's poorest regions. Eutrophication of ponds, salinization of soil, and
biodiversity loss in a forest patch involve crossing ecological thresholds at a spatially localised level.
Similarly, the metabolic pathways between an individual's nutritional status and his or her capacity to work,
and those between a person's nutritional and disease status involve positive feedback.
10 Unfortunately, even
applied studies frequently adopt linear approximations for modelling interrelationships involving non-
convexities. Dose-response relationships between pollutants and their effects on human functionings are often
taken to be linear, as are additional food and health-care requirements to combat widespread malnutrition
(World Bank, 1993; UNDP, 2003).     
11 See the interchange between D. Gale Johnson (2001) and Dasgupta (2001b) on this.
     
12 In an earlier classic, Arrow (1971) had observed that markets for externalities would suffer
from another problem: no matter whether the externalities are positive or negative, the markets
would be "thin", meaning that they would not be competitive.
     
13 Since the relative merits of regulations and taxes to curb pollution under asymmetric
information have been much discussed in the published literature (Meade, 1973; Cropper and Oates,
1992), we ignore them here.
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There are further links between poverty and the non-convexities that people face. For the poor, to
cross ecological thresholds can mean the foreclosure of substitution possibilities among resources, meaning
that their range of options is non-convex. Studies of extreme poverty based on aggregation at the regional
or national level can therefore mislead greatly.
11 The spatial confinement of many of the non-convexities
inherent in Human-Nature interactions needs always to be kept in mind.
1.6 Institutions and Non-Convexities
The market mechanism is especially problematic in those situations where ecological pathways
reflect significant non-convexities. It may prove impossible to decentralise an efficient allocation of resources
by means exclusively of prices. Efficient mechanisms would involve additional social contrivances, such as
(Pigovian) taxes and subsidies, quantity controls, social norms of behaviour, and so forth. Baumol and
Bradford (1972) and Starrett (1972) observed that non-convexities are prevalent when losses traceable to
environmental pollution are bounded. Starrett (1972) demonstrated that in the presence of such non-
convexities, a competitive equilibrium simply does not exist: markets for pollution would be unable to equate
demands to supplies. If the market price for pollution were negative (i.e., the pollutor has to pay the pollutee),
pollutees' demand would be unbounded, while supply would be bounded. On the other hand, if the price were
non-negative, demand would be zero, while supply, presumably, would be positive.
12
The finding implied that private property rights to environmental pollution would not be capable of
sustaining an efficient allocation of resources by means of the price system. However, Shapley and Shubik
(1970) had already demonstrated by means of an example that if property rights are awarded to polluters,
even such a non-price resource allocation mechanism as the core may not yield an outcome. The character
of non-convexities is shaped not only by Nature, but also by human institutions (Starrett, 1973).
In his classic article, Starrett (1972) showed formally that a suitably chosen set of (Pigovian)
pollution taxes, together with a system of competitive markets for other goods and services - assuming that
the latter constitute a convex sector - would be capable of supporting an efficient allocation of resources. As
there are no markets for pollution in such an allocation mechanism, the problem of equating supply to
demand in pollution activities is bypassed. The moral would appear to be that social difficulties arising from
the non-convexities can be overcome if the State were to assign property rights in a suitable way - permitting
private rights to the convex sector, but reserving for itself the right to control emissions and discharges, be
it directly in terms of regulations or indirectly by means of taxes and subsidies.
13
1.7 Welfare Economics in an Imperfect State
Institutions falter everywhere. Communitarian institutions that evolved to manage local common
property resources have been found to function effectively in some places, but examples abound where they
have malfunctioned (Baland and Platteu, 1996). There are even places where trust among citizens has been     
14 See the pioneering works of Repetto et al. (1989), Vincent et al. (1997), and Lange et al.
(2004) on the reconstruction of national accounts in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Southern Africa,
respectively, by including changes in the stocks of natural capital. For some years now, the United
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so weak, that communitarian institutions have not involved members beyond the "family" (Banfield, 1958).
As noted earlier, market failure is no uncommon phenomenon either.
It has been a common assumption in welfare economics, though, that the State operates effectively
in those matters where other institutions falter. The assumption pervades public economics, which was
developed for a society in which the State is not only trustworthy, but also optimizes on behalf of its citizens
(Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; Myles, 1995). Policy prescriptions emerging from the theory are first-best
(Utopian), or are at worst, second-best (Agathotopian; Meade, 1989). But such prescriptions are not self-
evidently relevant for the world we have come to know; perhaps most especially for the majority of today's
poor countries. In some places, the State is incompetent; in others it is predatory and vicious. It is hard to
imagine the sense in which governments in what are demonstrably failed or predatory states may be said to
be optimizing on behalf of their citizens.
However, it is not absurd to imagine that even in the most corrupt and predatory of governments,
there are honest people. It can be safely assumed that such figures are only minor officials, involved in
making marginal decisions (a road here, a local environmental protection plan there, and so on). What
language does welfare economics have to speak to such people? What intellectual tools do they have for
assessing whether the economic policies their governments are pursuing are likely to lead to sustainable
development?
2. Plan of the Paper
This paper is not meant to be a survey of recent work in environmental and resource economics. Our
aim is far more restricted. It is to offer an account of recent work that reconciles the conflicting intuitions
mentioned in Section 1.2. That work was built on the questions, observations, and findings sketched in
Sections 1.3-1.7. Each of the issues discussed there has been crucial for finding an answer to the question
of how the honest decision maker we have just alluded to can best conduct policy analysis. We show how
standard welfare economics can be adapted to enable the honest decision maker, even in the most
dysfunctional of societies, to weigh the various considerations when deliberating over small policy changes.
The formal language that is developed below can also be used in an informal way by the concerned citizen
to reason about economic policies.
Each of the issues discussed in Sections 1.3-1.7 has also been crucial for constructing a formal
language in which to determine whether economic development in a region, or among a group, has been
sustainable. We will discover that, when our dependence on Nature's services is acknowledged, there is a
strong element of "common sense" in economic reasoning. Paradoxes arise only when important factors of
production are dismissed as being negligible.
We confine ourselves to theoretical developments. When required for the purpose of motivating or
validating the theory, we describe applied work. But we do not elaborate on the applied work, nor do we
evaluate it. Applied research has occasionally shaped the development of the theory reported here (e.g., an
extensive literature on policy failures and the effects of civil disorder in many regions of the world), but it
has on occasion also been prompted by it.
14 Unfortunately, applied research has all too often lagged behindNations Statistical Office has been similarly engaged on an international scale.
     
15 Anderson (1987) and Markandya and Murty (2004) are among the few.
     
16 The widespread appeal to the environmental Kuznets curve, publicised in World Bank (1992),
is based on the idea that resource depletion is reversible.
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economic theory. For example, we have found no more than a handful of publications in which a project
involving ecological services has been evaluated comprehensively.
15 Studies estimating the value of
environmental amenities abound in the published literature, but it is a rare publication that uses such
estimates to conduct social cost-benefit analysis of projects involving those amenities. Moreover,
macroeconomic forecasts rarely include environmental resources. Accounting for the environment, if it
comes into the calculus at all, is an afterthought to the real business of "doing economics". To cite an
example, the environment and natural resources made no appearance in the authors' assessment of what lies
ahead in an influential, 38-page Survey of the World Economy in The Economist (25 September 1999). One
can only assume that the authors took it as given that they are in unlimited supply.
On occasion, therefore, we report theoretical derivations even when we have no estimates of their
orders of magnitude. We do so in order to encourage applied work. One of our motivations for preparing this
survey has been to persuade professional colleagues that neglecting natural capital in studies of the long run
can be hugely misleading. As a discipline, we would have been far ahead today in our understanding of the
pathways that have shaped economic change in various regions of the world if growth and development
economists had taken environmental and resource economics seriously in the past.
In Section 3, certain consequences of market imperfections in the use of natural resources are
identified. Hidden subsidies in the export of primary products, paid for, possibly, by some of the world's
poorest people, are identified. Biases in the direction of technological innovations are then discussed. One
tentative conclusion we reach is that the more familiar types of market imperfections lead to an excessive
use of natural resources.
Insights have been obtained by anthropologists, economists, and political scientists about resource
management in rural regions of the world's poorest countries. Their work documents that communitarian
institutions have often been successful in managing the local commons, but that at other times and places
they have failed, or have broken down. Whether or not communitarian institutions are a success, there is a
need to model their activities if public policies are to be evaluated. Section 4 is about communitarian
institutions. The examples reported there suggest how they could be modelled for the purposes of
understanding non-market allocation mechanisms guiding the use of environmental resources.
Section 5 studies an ecological process involving positive feedback. The example concerns
phosphorus discharge into a shallow, fresh water lake. Close variants of the mathematical model of the
shallow, fresh water lake have been used by ecologists and oceanographers to characterize diverse natural
processes. We use the model to show that a prevailing view in the economics literature about environmental
degradation, that it is mostly reversible, is misleading.
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Section 6 makes use of the findings in Sections 3-5 to develop welfare economics in imperfect
economies. We are interested in two related questions there: (1) How should one evaluate policy reform (e.g.,
an investment project) in an imperfect economy? (2) How is one to check whether an economic forecast10
reflects sustainable development? We do not presume that the economy is convex, nor do we assume that
the government optimizes on behalf of its citizens. We demonstrate first that, as in the case of first-best,
convex economies, shadow prices are useful tools for economic evaluation. Sustainable development is then
defined to be an economic programme along which intergenerational welfare does not decline. We show that
the same set of shadow prices should be used both for policy evaluation and for assessing whether or not an
economic forecast reflects sustained development. The wealth of a nation is the shadow value of its entire
stock of capital assets, including not only manufactured capital, knowledge, and human capital, but also
natural capital. We show that wealth, computed in terms of shadow prices, can be used as a criterion function
for problem (1) and a numerical index for problem (2). The first result follows from the fact that the present
discounted value of the flow of a project's shadow profits is the change in wealth at constant shadow prices.
In other words, the well known criterion for project evaluation - choose a project if and only if the present
discounted value of the flow of its social profits is positive - is really about changes to wealth brought about
by investment projects.
The second result follows from the fact that an increase in wealth, at constant shadow prices, signals
that intergenerational welfare is sustained during an interval of time. Therefore, at any moment of time,
wealth increases if and only if net investment is positive. First-best, convex economies are shown to be an
extreme special set of instances of the economies studied here.
Using the methods reported in Section 6, the way shadow prices can be estimated is explored in
Section 7 by means of two examples. One concerns water extraction under free entry, while the other studies
a polluted lake that is subject to a non-convex ecological process. The models developed in Sections 6-7
assume constant population and an absence of exogenous technological and institutional change. They also
assume an absence of uncertainty. In Section 8 we relax those assumptions in turn and extend the equivalence
result pertaining to changes in wealth and intergenerational welfare. Conditions under which wealth per
capita could be used as an index of intergenerational welfare are derived; moreover, recent estimates of
movements in wealth per capita in a number of countries are reported. In Section 9 we offer concluding
remarks.
3. Imperfect Markets
It is not uncommon today to interpret macroeconomic development in terms of the choices that are
made by an optimising dynasty, facing perfectly competitive markets for goods and services (Blanchard and
Fisher, 1989; Romer, 1996). Previously, such a view would have seemed puzzling. A large, post-War
literature on intertemporal welfare economics sought to identify reasons why the economies we observe
should not be expected to reflect optimum economic development. Three prominent reasons were identified:
(1) imperfect capital markets; (2) imperfect risk markets; and (3) household myopia. Each can be shown to
create a wedge between private and social rates of discount (see, for example, Arrow and Kurz, 1970; Lind,
1982; Arrow et al., 1996; Arrow et al., 2004).
Here we focus on the underpricing of environmental services. We study two examples to illustrate
ways in which resource allocation can go astray when markets fail.
3.1 Structural Adjustment and the Natural Environment
People have criticized the way the World Bank-International Monetary Fund structural adjustment
programmes were implemented in poor countries in the 1980s. Some have pointed to the additional hardship
the poor have experienced in their wake. Others have argued that in order to reduce deficits, governments     
17 Colchester (1995) has recounted that political representatives of forest-dwellers in Sarawak,
Malaysia, have routinely given logging licences to members of the state legislature. Primary forests
in Sarawak are expected to be depleted within the next decade or so. Cruz and Repetto (1992) have
described other pathways by which structural adjustment programmes have been unfriendly to the
natural environment.
     
18 The example is taken from Dasgupta (1990). Chichilnisky (1994) has developed the argument
in the text in a more general context. Hodgson and Dixon (1992) is a case-study on logging and its
impact on fisheries and tourism, in Palawan, the Philippines, that illustrates the example well.
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were led to embark on economic programmes that were particularly harsh on the natural resource base. Still
others have argued that the two effects have come in tandem, that structural adjustment programmes
encouraged countries to raise export revenue by depleting natural capital in a rapacious manner. On the other
hand, proponents of structural adjustment programmes have argued that they encouraged the growth of
markets and helped to reduce government deficits.
It is just possible that both proponents and opponents of the programmes were correct. The growth
of markets and a reduction in government deficits benefit many, but, simultaneously, they can make
vulnerable people face additional economic hardship. It is possible that the economic gains from structural
adjustment were in principle large enough to compensate the losers, but losers frequently are not
compensated; they may even remain undetected. There are a number of pathways by which this can happen.
Here we sketch one.
An easy way for the State to earn revenue in countries endowed with forests is to issue timber
concessions. The State can exercise its rights to forests that are public property by a judicious use of force
to evict long-term dwellers. Timber concessions can then be sold to favoured firms, reducing government
deficit, while simultaneously enlarging the private bank balances of officials. Forests are an easy target of
usurpation by the State, because there tend to be no legal documents proving ownership.
17
We leave aside the losses incurred by those evicted, because there is nothing really to say on the
matter other than platitudes. It is more fruitful to think instead about concessions made on forests in the
uplands of a watershed, so as to consider the ecological pathways by which deforestation inflicts damage on
people in the lowlands (siltation, increased incidence of flooding, and so forth).
18 It pays to study them in
terms of the assignment of property rights. The common law in many poor countries, if we are permitted to
use this expression in a universal context, recognizes pollutees' rights. So it is the timber merchant who, in
principle, would have to compensate downstream farmers for the right to inflict the damage that goes with
deforestation. However, even if the law sees the matter in this light, there is a gulf between the "written" law
and the enforcement of law. When the cause of damage is hundreds of miles away, when the timber
concession has been awarded to public land by the State, and when the victims are a scattered group of poor
farmers or fishermen, the issue of a negotiated outcome doesn't usually arise. But when the timber merchant
isn't required to compensate downstream farmers and fishermen, the private cost of logging is less than its
social cost. Therefore, from the social point of view, we would expect excessive deforestation of the uplands.
We would also expect that resource-based goods would be underpriced in the market (say, in export markets).
The less roundabout is the production of the final good, the greater would this underpricing be, in percentage
terms. Put another way, the lower is the value that is added to the resource in the course of production, the     
19 Agarwal and Narain (1996) is an interesting recent study in this vein.
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larger is the extent of this underpricing of the final product. The shadow price of timber being greater than
its market price, there is an implicit subsidy on primary forest products, possibly on a massive scale.
Moreover, the (export) subsidy is paid not by the general public via taxation, but by some of the most
disadvantaged members of society (the sharecropper, the small landholder or tenant farmer, the fisherman).
The subsidy is hidden from public scrutiny, which is why it isn't acknowledged officially. The hidden subsidy
is a wealth transfer from the exporting country to the country that does the importing. We should be in a
position to estimate such subsidies. As of now there are no such estimates.
3.2 Technological Biases
Such welfare indices as GNP per head are biased because they don't incorporate changes in the
stocks of natural capital. The market price of natural resources on site is frequently zero, even though they
are scarce goods. This means that commercial rates of return on investments that rely particularly on
resources are higher than their social rates of return. Therefore, resource intensive projects appear better
looking than they actually are. We would expect that, over time, an entire sequence of resource intensive
technologies would be installed. Moreover, people learn by doing and learn by using, not only installed
technology, but also in research and development. A large literature on technological change has shown that
there is in consequence an element of path dependence in the development and use of new technology
(Landau and Rosenberg, 1986; Dossi et al., 1988). The findings imply that modern technologies are not
always appropriate technologies, but are often unfriendly towards those who depend directly on the local
resource-base. The conclusion to be drawn poses a dilemma: it could be that we require a big push to move
us away from our especial dependence on natural resources. Although empirical evidence is still scarce, the
inappropriateness of installed technology is likely to be especially true in poor countries, where
environmental legislations are frequently neither strong nor effectively enforced.
The transfer of technology from advanced countries can be inappropriate even when that same body
of technology is appropriate in the country of origin. This is because shadow prices of natural resources,
especially local resources, vary from country to country. A project-design that is socially profitable in one
country may be socially unprofitable in another. This helps to explain why the poorest in poor countries,
when permitted, have been known to protest against the installation of modern technology. It also helps to
explain why environmental groups in poor countries not infrequently appear to be "backward-looking", trying
to unearth traditional technologies for soil conversation, water management, forest protection, medical
treatment, and so forth.
19 However, to do so isn't necessarily to assume an anti-science stance. Wrong prices
can tilt the technological agenda in wrong directions.
One can presume that the bias toward resource-intensive technologies extends to the prior stage of
research and development. When natural resources are underpriced, the incentives to develop technologies
that would economize on their use are lower than what they should be. It follows that, once it is perceived
that past choices have been especially damaging to the environment, cures are sought, whereas, prevention
could well have been the better choice. Contemporary debates on the viability of carbon sequestration on a
global scale is an illustration of this sequence of events.
4. Non-Market Institutions
Non-market institutions abound. In rural communities of poor countries, people rely on them for the13
purposes of obtaining credit and insurance, purchasing lumpy private goods (in what are called rotating
savings and credit associations, or ROSCAs), and constructing and maintaining local public goods (terraces,
shorelines, canals, and tanks). Non-market institutions supporting activities that involve the entire community
(building and maintaining local public goods) are of a communitarian variety.
Natural resources in rural regions of poor countries are, in consequence, often communally owned.
Not unoften, they are also communally managed. They are the local commons, comprising irrigation canals,
tanks, water holes, threshing grounds, coastal fisheries, grazing fields, rivulets, and woodlands. As a
proportion of total assets, the presence of local commons ranges widely across ecological zones. There is
evidence from India that the commons are most prominent in arid regions, mountain regions, and unirrigated
areas; they are least prominent in humid regions and river valleys (Agarwal and Narain, 1989; Chopra et al.,
1990). This suggests that communal ownership enables the rural poor to pool risks more effectively than
private ownership. Typically, the ownership is not "legal", but is instead, "historical". Whatever the source
of the authority that underpins the ownership structure, the local commons are not open to outsiders: they are
not "open access resources". Communal management is a frequent means by which the rural poor have tried
to avoid the tragedy of the commons. A formal model of local commons, both when they are managed
cooperatively and when not, was developed in Dasgupta and Heal (1979: Ch. 3). A large empirical literature
has since developed, describing the many ingenious rules and regulations societies have devised in order to
manage their local commons. (See Howe, 1986; Wade, 1988; Chopra et al., 1990; Feeny et al., 1990;
Ostrom, 1990, 1992; Stevenson, 1991; Baland and Platteau, 1996; Beck and Nesmith, 2001; National
Research Council, 2002; among many others.)
4.1 Importance of the Local Commons
Are the local commons important in people's lives? In a pioneering study, Jodha (1986) reported
evidence from over 80 villages in 21 dry districts in India, that among poor families the proportion of income
based directly on their local commons is in the range 15-25 percent. In a study of 29 villages in south-eastern
Zimbabwe, Cavendish (2000) arrived at even larger estimates: the proportion of income based directly on
the local commons is 35 percent, with the figure for the poorest quintile reaching 40 percent. Both
investigators discovered in their samples that richer households drew a smaller proportion of their total
income from the commons than poor households.
Communal management of local resources makes connection with social capital, viewed as a
complex of interpersonal networks, and hints at the basis upon which cooperation has traditionally been built
(Dasgupta, 1993, 2003b; Pretty and Ward, 2001). As the local commons have been seats of non-market
relationships, transactions involving them are often not mediated by market prices. So their fate can go
unreported in national economic accounts.
But there are wheels within wheels in communitarian relationships. In his work on South Indian
villages, Seabright (1997) showed that milk producers' cooperatives are more prevalent in the drier districts
there. But as the local commons are also more prevalent in drier districts, one way to interpret Seabright's
finding is that cooperation in one sphere of life (managing the commons) makes cooperation in other spheres
(marketing milk) that much easier: cooperation begets cooperation. The empirical literature on the local
commons is valuable because it has unearthed how institutions that are neither part of the market system nor
of the State develop organically to cope with resource allocation problems.
4.2 Weaknesses in Communal Ownership     
20 McKean (1992) stressed that benefits from the commons are frequently captured by the elite.
Agarwal and Narain (1996) revealed the same phenomenon in their study of water management
practices in a semi-arid village in the Gangetic plain.
     
21 Recently de Soto (2000) has identified the absence of well-defined property rights and their
protection as the central facts of underdevelopment. Rightly, he stressed the inability of poor people
to obtain credit because of a lack of collateral. In the text we are offering a multi-causal explanation
for poverty.
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Thus far, the good news about communitarian institutions. There are, however, two pieces of bad
news. First, a general finding from studies on the management of local commons is that entitlements to
products of the commons is frequently based on private holdings: richer households enjoy a greater
proportion of the benefits from the commons. Beteille (1983), for example, drew on examples from India to
show that access to the commons is often restricted to the elite (e.g., caste Hindus). Cavendish (2000) has
reported that, in absolute terms, richer households in his sample took more from the commons than poor
households. That women are sometimes excluded has also been recorded (e.g., from communal forestry;
Agarwal, 2001).
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The second piece of bad news is that local commons have degraded in recent years in many parts
of the poor world. Why should this happen now in those places where they had been managed in a
sustainable manner previously?
One reason is deteriorating external circumstances, which lower both the private and communal
profitability of investment in the resource base. There are many ways in which circumstances can deteriorate.
Increased uncertainty in property rights are a prime example. You and your community may think that you
together own the forest your forefathers passed on to you, but if you do not possess a deed to the forest, your
communal rights are insecure. In a dysfunctional state of affairs, the government may confiscate the property.
Political instability (in the extreme, civil war) is another source of uncertainty: your communal property could
be taken away from you by force. Political instability is also a direct cause of environmental degradation:
civil disturbance all too frequently expresses itself through the destruction of physical capital.
When people are uncertain of their rights to a piece of property, they are reluctant to make the
investments necessary to protect and improve it. If the security of a communal property is uncertain (owing
to whichever of the above reasons), the private returns expected from collective work on it are low. The
influence would be expected to run the other way too, with growing resource scarcity contributing to political
instability, as rival groups battle over resources. The feedback could be "positive", exacerbating the problem
for a time, reducing private returns on investment further. Groups fighting over spatially localized resources
are a frequent occurrence today (Homer-Dixon, 1999). Over time, the communitarian institutions themselves
disintegrate.
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The second reason is rapid population growth, which can trigger resource depletion if institutional
practices are unable to adapt to the increased pressure on resources. In C     ote d'Ivoire, for example, growth
in rural population has been accompanied by increased deforestation and reduced fallows. Biomass
production has declined, as has agricultural productivity (Lopez, 1998). Of course, rapid population growth
in the world's poorest regions in recent decades itself requires explanation. Increased economic insecurity,
owing to deteriorating institutions, is one identifiable cause: children are a fairly reliable form of capital asset
(Bledsoe, 1994; Guyer, 1994; Heyser, 1996). To be sure, there are other causes, but even if rapid population15
growth is a proximate cause of environmental destruction, the underlying cause would be expected to lie
elsewhere. Thus, when positive links are observed in the data between population growth, environmental
degradation, and poverty, they should not be read to mean that one of them is the prior cause of the others.
Over time, each could in turn be the cause of the others. (For the theory, see Dasgupta, 1993, 2003a; for a
recent empirical study on South Africa that tests the theory, see Aggarwal et al., 2001.)
The third reason is that management practices at the local level have been known on occasion to be
overturned by central fiat. A number of states in the Sahel imposed rules that in effect destroyed communal
management practices in the forests. Villages ceased to have the authority to enforce sanctions on those who
violated locally-instituted rules. State authority damaged local institutions and turned the local commons into
open-access resources (Thomson et al., 1986; Somanathan, 1991; Baland and Platteau, 1996).
And the fourth reason is that the management of local commons often relies on social norms of
behaviour, which are founded on reciprocity. But institutions that are based on reciprocity are fragile. They
are especially fragile in the face of growing opportunities for private investment in substitute resources
(Dasgupta, 1993, 2001a [2004]; Campbell et al., 2001). This is a case where an institution deteriorates even
when there is no deterioration in external circumstances, nor population pressure. However, when traditional
systems of management collapse and aren't replaced by institutions that can act as substitutes, the use of the
local commons becomes unrestrained. The commons then deteriorate, leading to the proverbial "tragedy of
the commons". In a recent study, Balasubramanian and Selvaraj (2003) have found that one of the oldest
sources of irrigation - village tanks - have deteriorated over the years in a sample of villages in southern
India, owing to a gradual decline in collective investment in their maintenance. The decline has come about
because richer households have invested increasingly in private wells. Since poor households depend not
only on tank water, but also on the fuelwood and fodder that grow round the tanks, the move to private wells
on the part of the richer households has accentuated the economic stress experienced by the poor.
History tells us that the local commons can be expected to decline in importance in tandem with
economic development (North and Thomas, 1973). Ensminger's (1990) study of the privatization of common
grazing lands among the Orma in northeastern Kenya established that the transformation took place with the
consent of the elders of the tribe. She attributed this to cheaper transportation and widening markets, making
private ownership of land more profitable. The elders were, quite naturally, from the stronger families, and
it did not go unnoted by Ensminger that privatization accentuated inequality within the tribe.
The point is not to lament the decline of the commons, it is to identify those who are likely to get
hurt by the transformation of economic regimes. That there are winners in the process of economic
development is a truism. Much the harder task is to identify the likely losers and have policies in place that
act as safety nets for them.
5. Nature's Non-Convexities
Thus far, we have traced environmental problems to institutional failure and to institutional changes.
We now turn to one important source of policy failure: the inappropriate modelling of ecological and
economic pathways. We do that by studying non-convexities in ecological processes.
Despite the strictures of ecologists, we economists have remained ambivalent toward Nature's non-
convexities. Often, that ambivalence reveals itself indirectly. For example, it is commonly thought that "...
economic growth is good for the environment, because countries need to put poverty behind them in order
to care", (Editorial, The Independent, 4 December 1999); or that "... trade improves the environment, because     
22 See also Cropper and Griffiths (1994) and Grossman and Krueger (1995). Copeland and
Taylor (2004) is an extensive survey on the subject of trade, growth, and the environmental Kuznets
curve.
     
23 Arrow et al. (1995) contains an early interpretative commentary on the environmental Kuznets
curve. Responses to that article were published in symposia in Ecological Economics, 1995, Vol.
15, No. 1; Ecological Applications, 1996, Vol. 6, No. 1; and Environment and Development
Economics, 1996, Vol. 1, No. 1. See also the special issue of Environment and Development
Economics, 1997, Vol. 2, No. 4.
     
24 A mathematically identical model, concerning open access to a non-convex fishery, was
presented in Dasgupta (1982).
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it raises incomes, and the richer people are, the more willing they are to devote resources to cleaning up their
living space", (The Economist, 4 December 1999: 17).
The view's widespread acceptance in the popular press is traceable to World Bank (1992), which
reported an empirical relationship between GNP per head and atmospheric concentrations of industrial
pollutants. Based on the historical experience of OECD countries, the authors of the document suggested that,
when GNP per head is low, concentrations of such pollutants as the sulphur oxides increase as GNP per head
increases, but that when GNP per head is high, concentrations decline as GNP per head increases further.
Among economists, this relationship has been christened the "environmental Kuznets curve".
22 In the popular
literature, the morals that would appear to have been drawn from the finding are (1) that "the environment"
is a luxury good, affordable only by the rich, and (2) that resource degradation is reversible: degrade all you
want now, Earth can be relied upon to rejuvenate it later should you require it.
As general viewpoints, both presumptions are false. To be sure, there are natural amenities that
could be regarded as luxuries (e.g., places of scenic beauty); however, producing as it does a multitude of
ecosystem services, a large part of what Nature offers us is a necessity. We offered illustrations of this fact
in the previous section when accounting for the role of the local natural resource base in the lives of the rural
people in the world's poorest countries. Here, we note that Nature's non-convexities are frequently a
manifestation of positive feedback processes, which in turn can mean the presence of ecological thresholds.
But if a large damage were to be inflicted on an ecosystem whose ability to function is conditional on it being
above some threshold level (in size, composition, or whatever), the consequence would be irreversible. The
environmental Kuznets curve was detected for mobile pollutants (e.g., atmospheric pollutants). Mobility
means that, so long as emissions decline, the stock at the site of the emissions declines. However, reversal
is the last thing that would spring to mind should a grassland "tip" to become covered by shrubs, or should
the Atlantic gulf stream shift direction or come to a halt, or should a source of water disappear, or should an
ocean fishery become a dead zone owing to overfishing. As a general metaphor for the possibilities of
substituting manufactured and human capital for natural capital, the relationship embodied in the
environmental Kuznets curve has to be rejected.
23
5.1 Convex-Concave Pollution Recycling Functions
We illustrate Nature's non-convexities by studying a pollution problem that has been much analysed
in recent years: phosphorus discharge into a shallow, fresh water lake (Scheffer, 1997; Carpenter et al., 1999;
Carpenter, 2001).
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Phosphorus inflow into a lake is a byproduct of agriculture in the watershed. The inflow is a fertilizer     
25 Close variants of equation (2) have been postulated for a number of natural systems. Here are
three examples:
(1) In order to explain periodic infestations of the spruce budworm in boreal forests, Ludwig
et al. (1978) postulated that the budworm's population, Kt, changes in accordance with the equation
dKt/dt =  Kt -  Kt
2 - bKt
2/(1+Kt
2), ( , ,b > 0), (2a)
where the final, forcing term denotes predation by birds.
(2) The account of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation in Rahmstorf (1995) can be
formalised in terms of an equation not dissimilar to equation (2). Temperature and salt gradients
across the North and South Atlantic give rise to the circulation. Kt is taken to be the North Atlantic
deep water flow (travelling south) and C is the amount of fresh water entering, say, the surface of
the North Atlantic (in part from ice melts). The circulation would come to a halt if C were too large.
(3) Vegetation cover in the savannahs depends on rainfall, but rainfall in turn depends on
vegetation cover. Denoting rainfall by Ct and vegetation (in biomass) by Kt, suppose, as a first
approximation, that
Ct =  Kt and dKt/dt = bCt
2/(1+Ct
2) -  Kt, ( ,b,  > 0). (2b)
The pair of equations (2a,b) are variants of (2).
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runoff from farms. Phosphorus is a key determinant of the state of a lake. It is a necessary nutrient for such
ecological services as those that provide a habitat for fish populations. Thus, shallow clear fresh water lakes
can absorb a low level of phosphorus with little ill effect. However, if the quantity of phosphorus in the water
column increases, more algae grow, meaning that less sunlight reaches the lake bottom, thus damaging the
green plants on the bottom. The bottom sediments contain phosphorus in dead algae and depositions of
phosphorus from the water column. The lake bottom phosphorus is harmless. However, a reduction in green
plants in the lake bottom means that bottom sediments are less well protected from being flushed back into
the water column by fish movements and water currents. Phosphorus is then released from the lake bottom
into the water column, thereby increasing the growth of algae. This chain of events is a positive feedback.
On the other hand, as noted above, some of the phosphorus in the water column continuously settles on the
lake bottom, and this dampens the feedback. We now model the phenomenon.
Time is assumed to be continuous and is denoted by t (  0). Let the state of a shallow fresh water
lake at t be the quantity of phosphorus in the water column at that moment, which we denote by Kt (  0). Let
Ct (  0) be the phosphorus inflow into the system at t. It has been found that the following is a good
approximation of the dynamics of the state of the lake (Scheffer, 1997):
dKt/dt = Ct + bKt
2/(1+Kt
2) -  Kt, b,   > 0. (1)
The positive feedback governing the recycling of phosphorus from the lake bottom into the water column
is given by the second term on the right hand side of equation (1), which is convex-concave, with a least
upper bound of b. The rate at which phosphorus in the water column settles on the lake bottom is given by
the third term on the right hand side of equation (1). Therefore, (bKt
2/(1+Kt
2) -  Kt) is the net natural
reproduction rate of phosphorus in the water column; and  /b is a measure of the strength of the damping
effect that tempers the positive feedback.
For simplicity, suppose that phosphorus inflow is a constant, C. It follows that
dKt/dt = C + bKt
2/(1+Kt
2) -  Kt,K 0 (> 0) given.
25 (2)
Equation (2) contains three parameters: C, b, and  . We would like to know how the ecosystem's     
26 Mathematicians call this a "saddle-node bifurcation".
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character depends on them. One expects that mostly the global properties of the ecosystem would vary
continuously with the parameters. One should also expect that there are manifolds partitioning the parameter
space into regions, such that the ecosystem's structure is the same at every point in any given region, but
differs from the structure in the region adjacent to it. Such manifolds bifurcate the system's properties. To
study the bifurcations, we take b and   to be given and vary C. The reason we permit C to vary is that C
denotes human intervention and we could in principle control it.
So, consider the equation
bK
2/(1+K
2) =  K. (3)
Real solutions of equation (3) are the stationary points of equation (2) with C = 0.
We begin by assuming that  /b > 1/2, meaning that phosphorus in the water column settles in the
lake bottom rapidly. In this case equation (3) has only one real solution: it is K = 0. Simple graphics (Figure
1) confirm, however, that there are values of C for which equation (2) has three (real) stationary points.
Assuming one such value, C = C , we label the stationary points as K1 (<) K2 (<) K3, respectively. K2 is
unstable, while K1 and K3 are locally stable. K2 is the separatrix of the system - the point that separates the
two basins of attraction of the ecosystem. K1 reflects an oligotrophic state (reasonably clear water), whereas
K3 reflects a eutrophic state (turbid water).
5.2 Ecosystem Flips
Continuing to hold b and   constant, let us now reduce C from its original value C . It is simple
to confirm visually that the unstable stationary point (continue to label it K2) and the larger of the two locally
stable stationary points (continue to label it K3) get closer to each other continuously. It is simple to confirm
as well that there is a critical value of C, call it C*, for which K2 and K3 coincide to form a point that is stable
from the right, but unstable from the left. C* is a bifurcation point of the system: if C < C*, the ecosystem
possesses a unique (stable) stationary point, whereas if C > C* (but C < C**; see below), it possesses three
stationary points. In short, the system's structure changes discontinuously at C*.
26
In contrast, suppose C were to increase from C . It is simple to confirm visually (Figure 1) that the
unstable stationary point (continue to label it K2) and the smaller of the two locally stable stationary points
(continue to label it K1) would get closer to each other continuously, until, at a critical value of C, call it C**,
the two would coincide, to form a point that is unstable from the right, but stable from the left. C** is another
bifurcation point of the system: if C > C**, the ecosystem possesses a unique (stable) stationary point,
whereas if C < C** (but C > C*), it possesses three stationary points.
In Figure 2 we have drawn the equilibrium values of K as a correspondence of C for a given pair of
values of b and  . Equilibrium K is unique when C < C*. For C in the interval [C*, C**], the curve depicting
K as a correspondence of C bends back and then back again, to reflect the fact that equation (2) possesses
three stationary points. The two upward sloping portions of the correspondence consist of (locally) stable
stationary values of K, whereas the downward sloping portion consists of unstable stationary points.
We now conduct a thought experiment. Begin in a situation where C < C*. We know that
equilibrium K is small. We would like to discover how the system would change if C were to increase in a
predictable way. Rather than try to integrate equation (1), we simplify by imagining that C increases slowly
relative to the speed of adjustment of Kt. By "slowly" we mean that at each C the ecosystem is able to19
equilibrate itself. If C were to increase under such conditions, K would increase continuously along the lower
arm of the curve until C = C**, at which point equilibrium K would "flip" to the upper arm of the curve. The
ecosystem therefore undergoes a discrete change at C**. Further increases in C would lead to a continual
increase in K along the upper arm of the curve in Figure 2.
Ecosystem flips have been observed many times and at many scales. Shallow lakes have been known
to tip from clear to turbid water in a matter of months, village tanks in a matter of weeks, garden ponds in
a matter of hours. Insect populations have been known to crash or explode in a matter of days. Larger
ecosystems generally take longer to flip at their bifurcation points, because the underlying processes operate
over greater distances and are therefore slower. Grasslands in sub-Saharan Africa can take more than a
decade to change into shrublands. The "salt conveyor" that drives global ocean circulation would probably
take between decades and a century to shut down (or change direction) if the Greenland ice cover were to
melt at rates estimated in current models of global warming (Rahmstorf, 1995). The fossil records suggest
that the interglacials and glacials of ice ages have appeared only occasionally, but have arrived and departed
"precipitously" - the flips occuring over several thousand years. And so on.
5.3 Hysteresis in Ecosystem Dynamics
Now suppose we were to reverse the process in our previous thought experiment. Start with C > C**
and reduce it slowly. Figure 2 shows that on the return journey, K declines continuously along the upper arm,
so long as C > C*. This means that for C in the interval [C*, C**], K remains higher than it had been on the
onward journey. To put it another way, the ecosystem displays hysteresis. However, at C = C* the ecosystem
tips onto the lower arm of the curve in Figure 2. Further declines in K would occur continuously if C were
reduced further. We conclude that even though the ecosystem displays hysteresis, environmental degradation
is reversible: given enough time, K can be made to be as small as we like if C were reduced sufficiently. This
is the intellectual basis of the environmental Kuznets curve, mentioned earlier. It would certainly be a correct
view of future possibilities if the damping term in the positive feedback were sufficiently large ( /b > 1/2).
5.4 Irreversibility
But now consider a less happy possibility. Suppose that  /b < 1/2, which means that the positive
feedback is powerful. Equation (2) possesses three real solutions. One is K = 0, while the other two are
positive. Figure 3, which is the counterpart of Figure 1, depicts this case. We now use Figure 3 to construct
Figure 4, which plots the equilibrium values of K as a correspondence of C. In contrast to Figure 2, the curve
bends backward to cut the vertical axis.
Let us conduct the thought experiment again. Suppose we begin in a situation where both C and K
are low, meaning that the system is on the lower arm of the curve in Figure 4. As C increases, K increases
continuously, until the bifurcation point, C***, is reached. At this point the ecosystem flips to a higher value
of K. However, once that happens, the system is incapable of reversing itself. Declines in C would certainly
reduce K, but as Figure 3 shows, even if C were reduced to zero, the system would remain on the upper arm
of the curve, at a higher value of K than it did to begin with. Not only does the ecosystem suffer from
hysteresis, but environmental degradation is now in addition irreversible: the system is unable to return to
where it had been in the beginning.
Now consider decision makers who are persuaded that the environmental Kuznets curve is a reliable
summary of the complex relationships between the environment and economic development. If they were
to rely on that curve to address phosphorus load in the lake, they would regard increases in phosphorus in20
the water column to be reversible. The irony would be that, if, in aiding economic development, the flow of
phosphorus were to be allowed to go beyond C***, it would not be possible to bring the lake back to a clear
state by curbing C after people become rich. Moreover, if the lake were essential to people's livelihood (and,
remember, we are using "lake" as a metaphor here), the irony would be a tragedy, because the very process
by which people were attempting to become rich would lead to their eventual undoing: people wouldn't be
rich if the lake were destroyed. Even if C were reduced to zero, the lake would remain polluted. This is why
the mechanism relating economic development to the environment that was invoked by The Independent
and The Economist, quoted earlier, is misleading.
The "resilience" of a system is its capacity to withstand perturbations without undergoing significant
changes in its character. It is neither a good nor a bad property of a system. To illustrate, suppose that the lake
absorbs a constant phosphorus load C (< C**) and suppose that the lake is in an oligotrophic state (a point
on the lower arm of Figure 2). Its resilience would be the extent to which it can admit an increase in
phosphorus load without tipping onto a eutrophic state. A simple measure of resilience would be the distance
(C**-C). Of course, the lake could be resilient in a eutrophic state too. Thus, if K represents a eutrophic state,
and the lake absorbs phosphorus load C (a point on the upper arm of Figure 2), the measure of resilience
would be the distance (C-C*). In the case where pollution is irreversible (Figure 4), the eutrophic state is
wholly resilient: once the lake is in that state, there is no way it can be brought back to an oligotrophic state.
6. Intergenerational Welfare Economics in Imperfect Economies
In Sections 3-5 we noted ways in which environmental and resource problems arise from (1)
institutional failure and (2) policies emerging from the use of misspecified models of ecosystems. Within
institutional failure we include failure of the State. We now use those instances to develop intergenerational
welfare economics for the honest civil servant introduced in Section 1.7. We do this by determining rules that
can be used to evaluate small perturbations to macroeconomic forecasts. Our motivation for modelling the
evaluation problem in this manner is straightforward. The civil servant in question is honest and wishes to
improve intergenerational welfare. But he (or she) is only a small cog in machinery of government, and so
can exercise very little influence. At best, our honest civil servant has the opportunity to evaluate a
perturbation to a given economic programme.
A forecast is based on a reading of technological and environmental possibilities, and on the
behaviour of households, firms, communities, and the State. A perturbation to the forecast is to be interpreted
as a project under the jurisdiction of the honest civil servant. We show below that the required evaluation
rule involves the use of shadow prices that can be estimated by perturbing the forecast. The rule itself is to
check whether the present discounted value of the flow of shadow profits generated by the perturbation is
positive. Thus, the criterion for choice is the one that has for long been advocated for social cost-benefit
analysis in optimizing economies. The analysis does not require the economy to be convex.
We also develop a criterion for assessing whether or not intergenerational welfare is sustained along
an economic forecast. In the context of an economic model where population is constant, it is confirmed that
the shadow prices that should be used in social cost-benefit analysis can also be used to compute an index
for assessing whether intergenerational welfare is sustained. That index is a comprehensive measure of the
social worth of the entire stock of the economy's capital assets, inclusive of manufactured, human, and natural
capital assets. We call this wealth. Our analysis does not require the economy to be convex.
6.1 Resource Allocation Mechanisms     
27 The following analysis does not require U to be concave. We assume concavity none the less
for ethical reasons: (strict) concavity reflects concern for equity, both among people of the same
generation and among people of different generations.  
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The economy to be studied is closed. Population is constant. Time is continuous and is denoted
variously by   and t ( , t   0). The horizon is taken to be infinite. For simplicity of exposition, we aggregate
consumption into a single commodity flow, C, and let R denote a vector of resource flows (e.g., rates of
extraction of natural resources, expenditure on education and health).
We are thinking of an economy here in a broad sense. Depending on the context in which a study
is conducted, the economy could be a household, a village, a district, a province, a nation, or, at the grandest
level of aggregation, the world as a whole. The state of the economy is represented by the vector K, where
K is a comprehensive list of capital assets, including not only manufactured capital, knowledge and skills,
but also natural capital. For notational simplicity, we eschew intratemporal allocation problems here. Were
they to be included, K would be a vector of a larger dimension. Capital assets would be "named" in terms
of the character of their ownership, in the way general equilibrium theory has made familiar.
Certain types of natural capital are directly valuable as stocks in production and consumption (e.g.,
resources having intrinsic value). For expositional ease, we assume in this section that such stock effects are
absent. Labour is assumed throughout to be supplied inelastically and is normalised to be unity. Current
utility is therefore taken to depend only on consumption. We write this as U(C), where U(C) is a strictly
concave, twice differentiable, and monotonically increasing function.
27 Intergenerational welfare -
henceforth, social welfare - at t (  0) is
Wt = t 
 U(C )e
- ( -t)d ,   > 0. (4)
(Koopmans, 1972, uncovered ethical axioms that yield expression (4) as the index of social welfare.)
We now formalise the idea of an imperfect economy (Dasgupta and Mäler, 2000; Dasgupta, 2001a
[2004]; Arrow et al., 2003a). Assume that the economy faces not only technological and ecological
constraints, but also a wide variety of institutional constraints (sometimes called transaction and information
constraints). By the economy's institutions we mean market structures, the structure of property rights, tax
rates, non-market institutions (for credit, insurance, and common property resources), the character of various
levels of government, and so forth. We do not assume that the government is bent on maximizing social
welfare subject to constraints. As noted earlier, it could be that the government is predatory, or is at best
neglectful, and has objectives of its own that are not congruent with citizens' welfare. Nor is it assumed that
institutions are unchanging. What we do assume is that institutions co-evolve with the state of the economy
(K) in ways that are understood. It is no doubt a truism that social and political institutions influence the
evolution of the state of an economy, but it has also been argued by political scientists (Lipset, 1959) that the
state of an economy (K) influences the evolution of social and political institutions. The theory presented
here accommodates this mutual influence.
Let {C , R , K }t
  be an economic programme from t to  . Given technological possibilities,
resource availabilities, and the dynamics of the ecological-economic system, the decisions made by
individual agents and consecutive governments from t onwards will determine C , R , and K   -  for   
t  -  as functions of Kt,  , and t. Thus if Kt is the vector of capital assets at t, let f(Kt,  , t), g(Kt,  , t), and
h(Kt,  , t), respectively, be consumption, the vector of resource flows, and the vector of capital assets at date22
  (  t). {C , R , K }t
  can therefore also be thought of as an economic forecast at t. Now write
(  )t
    {C , R , K }t
 , t   0. (5)
Let {t, Kt)} denote the set of possible t and Kt pairs, and {(  )t
 } the set of economic programmes from t
to infinity.
Definition 1. A resource allocation mechanism,  , is a (many-one) mapping
 : {t, Kt}   {(  )t
 }. (6)
We do not assume that   maps {t, Kt} into optimum economic programmes (starting at t), nor even
that it maps {t, Kt} into efficient programmes (starting at t). The following analysis is valid even if   is
riddled with economic distortions and inequities. As noted above, nor do we assume that the economy's
institutions are fixed. If institutions and the state of the economy were known to co-evolve, that co-evolution
would be reflected in  . Note too that we do not assume transformation possibilities among commodities
and services to constitute convex sets.
Institutional assumptions underlie the notion of resource allocation mechanism. For example, aspects
of the concept of "social capital" (Putnam, 1993), ideas relating to "social capability" (Adelman and Morris,
1965; Abramovitz, 1986), and the notion underlying the term "social infrastructure" (Hall and Jones, 1999)
appear as part of the defining characteristics of  . Moreover, the prevalence (or absence) of trust and honest
behaviour in the economy are embodied in  , as are mutual expectations of one another's intentions.
However, one important aspect of the concept of social capital, namely, interpersonal networks, is a
component of human capital, and therefore appears in the vector K. (Dasgupta, 2003b, elaborates on the
classification.)
To make the dependence of the economic forecast on   explicit, let {Ct( ), Rt( ), Kt( )}0
  denote
the forecast at t = 0. Consider date t (  0). We may now write equation (4) as,
Wt   t 
 U(C ( ))e
- ( -t)d , (7)
which is social welfare at t. Wt is a function of the state of the economy, Kt, and the resource allocation
mechanism,  . So we can express it as the value function:
V(Kt, ,t)   Wt   t 
 U(C ( ))e
- ( -t)d . (8)
It transpires that the value function is a more useable object in the welfare economics of imperfect economies
than the familiar Hamiltonian of dynamic optimization theory. So we work with the value function here.
Before putting the concept of resource allocation mechanism to work, it is as well to discuss
examples. (In Sections 7-8 we illustrate by means of formal models.)
1. Consider a one-commodity world with constant population. Households save a constant
proportion, s (0 < s < 1), of output. Capital depreciates at a constant rate   (> 0). Assume that if K is the
stock of the capital asset, F(K) is aggregate output, where F (K) > 0, sF (0) >  , and F"(K) < 0. It follows
that capital accumulates according to the dynamics
dK /d  = sF(K ) -  K ,     t   0.
(The above is a stripped-down version of the Solow model of economic growth). An economic programme
at t can be expressed as {C , K }t
 , where C  = (1-s)F(K ). The above specification defines a resource
allocation mechanism.
2. Imagine a first-best economy. There the resource allocation mechanism   maps (Kt, ,t) to the
corresponding optimum programme. Much of the literature on the welfare economics of the environment has
been based on this mechanism. (Heal, 1998, contains a fine exposition of first-best allocations.)23
3. Assume that all capital assets are private property and that there is a complete set of competitive
forward markets capable of sustaining a unique equilibrium. In this case   maps (Kt, ,t) to the equilibrium.
(If equilibrium is not unique, a selection rule among the multiple equilibria would have to be specified.)
Much modern macroeconomics is founded on this mechanism.
4. Of particular interest are situations where some of the assets are not private property. Consider
the cases where manufactured capital is private property, but natural capital is common property (Section 4).
It may be that natural capital assets are local common property resources, not open to outsiders. If assets are
managed efficiently, we are in effect back to the case of a competitive equilibrium allocation, albeit one not
entirely supported by market prices, but in part by, say, social norms.
5. On the other hand, it may be that local institutions are not functioning well (e.g., because social
norms are breaking down and private benefits from using environmental natural resources exceed social
benefits). Suppose in addition that decisions bearing on the accumulation of manufactured capital are guided
by the profit motive. Then these behavioural rules together help to determine  . In a similar manner, we
could (as we do in Section 7) characterize   for the case where there is open access to a natural resource
base.
Definition 2.   is time autonomous (henceforth autonomous) if for all     t,  ( ) is a function solely of
Kt and ( -t).
If   is autonomous, economic variables at date   (  t) are functions of Kt and ( -t) only. So 
would be non-autonomous if, say, knowledge, or the terms of trade (for a trading economy), were to change
exogenously over time. In Section 6.5 we have occasion to comment further on the reasonableness of
regarding   as autonomous.
Definition 3.   is time-consistent if
h(K  , ",  ) = h(Kt, ",t), for all  ",   , and t. (9)
Time-consistency implies a weak form of rationality. An autonomous resource allocation
mechanism, however, has little to do with rationality; it has to do with the influence of external factors (e.g.,
whether trade prices are changing autonomously). In what follows, it is assumed that   is time-consistent.
6.2 Differentiability of the Value Function
Let Ki be the ith capital stock. We assume that V is right- and left-differentiable in Ki for all i
everywhere. Unaided intuition could suggest that this is a strong assumption. The mathematical properties
of V depend upon the mathematical properties of  , and problems are compounded because production and
substitution possibilities in the economy are embodied in  , as is the economy's underlying institutional
structure. Moreover, there are no obvious limits to the kinds of institutions one can imagine. In many parts
of the world the State has been known to act in bizarre and horrible ways. Nevertheless, we argue below that
the assumption is weak. In any case, if the location of the points at which V is non-differentiable is uncertain
and the uncertainty is a sufficiently smooth probability distribution, the expected value of V would be
differentiable everywhere.
6.3 Shadow Prices
We confirm below that shadow prices are useful in imperfect economies, whether or not they are
convex. First, we define them. It would simplify the exposition if we could avoid mentioning left- and right-
derivatives of V. So, in what follows, we work on the assumption that V is differentiable.
Definition 4. The shadow price, pit, of the ith capital asset is defined as     
28 In Dasgupta and Mäler (2000) it was mistakenly claimed that it does so even in imperfect
economies. We are grateful to Geir Asheim for correcting the error in that article and deriving
equation (11).
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pit =  Vt/ Kit    V(Kt, ,t)/ Kit. (10)
In expression (10), pit is the spot price of Kit; it is the asset's social scarcity value. Note that shadow
prices are defined in terms of hypothetical perturbations to an economic forecast. The shadow price of a
capital asset is the present discounted value of the perturbations to U that would arise from a marginal
increase in the asset's quantity. Notice also that the shadow price of a private commodity could be negative
in an imperfect economy even if it would have been positive if the economy were a well-managed one. For
example, consider that when a fossil fuel is burnt, the resulting pollutant is emited into the atmosphere. If the
atmosphere as a sink is a free good, the result is a tragedy of the commons. The shadow price of the fossil
fuel would be negative if the social damage that is caused when someone burns the fuel exceeds the private
benefit to that person. In a well-managed economy, the negative externality would not exist.
Given the resource allocation mechanism  , shadow prices at t are functions of Kt and, if   is non-
autonomous, of t as well. Thus, pit = pit(Kt). The prices depend also on the extent to which various capital
assets are substitutable for one another. If   is autonomous, shadow prices do not depend explicitly on time,
and so, pit = pi(Kt). All future effects on the economy of changes in the structure of assets are reflected in
shadow prices. That is why they are useful objects. Having stressed their functional dependence on   and
K (and, possibly, t as well), we drop   and K from the formulae so as to save on notation.
6.4 Marginal Rates of Substitution vs Market Observables
Using equations (8) and (10), one can show that if   is autonomous, pit satisfies the equation,
dpit/dt =  pit - U (Ct) Ct/ Kit -  jpjt (dKjt/dt)/ Ki. (11)
Equation (11) reduces to the Pontryagin equations for co-state variables in the case where   is an optimum
resource allocation mechanism.
28 However, in order to study the evolution of shadow prices under simple
resource allocation mechanisms, it is more intuitive to work directly with (10); which is why the familiar
Hamiltonian of dynamical systems does not make an appearance in our account.
From equation (10) it also follows that shadow price ratios (pit/pjt, pit /pit), and consumption discount
rates (see below) are defined as marginal social rates of substitution between goods. In an economy where
the government maximizes social welfare, marginal rates of substitution among goods and services equal
their corresponding marginal rates of transformation. As the latter are observable in market economies (e.g.,
border prices for traded goods in an open economy), shadow prices are frequently defined in terms of
marginal rates of transformation among goods and services. However, marginal rates of substitution in
imperfect economies do not necessarily equal the corresponding marginal rates of transformation. This is why
shadow prices are difficult to estimate in imperfect economies. A distinction needs to be made between the
ingredients of social welfare and market observables. Using market observables to infer social welfare can
be misleading in imperfect economies. That we may have to be explicit about ethical parameters (e.g.,   and
the elasticity of U) in order to estimate marginal rates of substitution in imperfect economies is not an
argument for pretending that the economies in question are not imperfect after all. In principle it could be
hugely misleading to use the theory of optimum control to justify an exclusive interest in market observables.     
29 Pezzey (1992) and Pezzey and Toman (2002) are penetrating accounts of various
interpretations of the idea of sustainable development.
     
30 Kenneth Arrow has produced an example of an optimum economic programme displaying
such a feature.
     
31 Dasgupta (2001a, [2004]) and Arrow et. al (2004) call this genuine investment.
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6.5 Wealth, (Inclusive) Investment, and Sustainable Welfare
The phrase "sustainable development" was introduced by the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN, 1980). The publication drew attention to the role
played by the natural environment in our economic life. But the phrase become a commonplace only after
the publication of a report by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), widely
known as the Brundtland Commission Report, where sustainable development was defined as "...
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs" (WCED, 1987: 43). The idea is that, relative to their respective demographic bases,
each generation should bequeath to its successor at least as large a productive base as it had inherited from
its predecessor. If it were to do so, the economic possibilities facing the successor would be no worse than
those it faced when inheriting productive assets from its predecessor.
The notion of sustainable development therefore invites us to seek a measure that would enable us
to judge whether an economy's productive base is growing. Consider, however, an interpretation of
sustainability that is based on the maintainence of social welfare, rather than on the maintainance of the
productive base:
Definition 5. The economic programme {Ct, Rt, Kt)}0
  corresponds to a sustainable development path at t
if dVt/dt   0.
Below we show that the requirement that economic development be sustainable implies, and is
implied by, the requirement that the economy's productive base be maintained (Propositions 1-3). These
results give intellectual support for Definition 5, which is why we do not go into various alternative
definitions of sustainable development here.
29
Notice that the criterion for sustainablity in Definition 5 does not identify a unique economic
programme. In principle any number of technologically and ecologically feasible economic programmes
could satisfy the criterion. On the other hand, if substitution possibilities among capital assets are severely
limited and technological advances are unlikely to occur, it could be that there is no sustainable economic
programme open to an economy. Furthermore, even if the government were bent on maximizing social
welfare, the chosen programme would not correspond to a sustainable path if the welfare discount rate,  ,
were too high (Dasgupta and Heal, 1974). It could also be that along an optimum path social welfare declines
for a period and then increases thereafter, in which case the optimum programme does not correspond to a
sustainable path locally, but does so in the long run.
30
Optimality and sustainability are thus different notions. The concept of sustainability helps us to
better understand the character of economic programmes, and is particularly useful for judging the
performance of imperfect economies.
Definition 6. Inclusive investment at t, It, is It =  i(pitdKit/dt).
31     
32 This result was proved (and its significance recognised) for optimally managed, convex
economies by Pearce and Atkinson (1995). Significant precursors to their result were Samuelson
(1961), Solow (1974), and Hartwick (1977). Dasgupta and Mäler (2000) proved the result for
arbitrary economies. Arrow et al. (2003a) contains the most general results to date on the
equivalence between sustainable development and wealth movements. (They studied arbitrary
economies, where population is not constant and where exogeneous technological and institutional
changes occur.)
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Differentiating equation (8) with respect to t, we have
Proposition 1. dVt/dt =  Vt/ t +  ipitdKit/dt. (12)
If   is autonomous,  Vt/ t = 0, and we have
Proposition 2. dVt/dt =  ipitdKit/dt = It. (13)
Equation (13) states that if   is autonomous, inclusive investment equals the rate at which social welfare
changes.
32
Definition 7. Inclusive wealth at t is  ipitKit.
Notice that inclusive investment is the rate at which inclusive wealth changes, while holding shadow prices
constant. Therefore, Proposition 2 states that if   is autonomous, the rate at which social welfare changes
equals the rate at which inclusive wealth changes, while holding shadow prices constant.
There is a sense in which, the smaller is the unit that is being called an "economy", the less likely
it is that   would be autonomous. A household, for example, faces terms of trade with the rest of the world,
over which it has no control. If those terms are expected to change over time, the resource allocation
mechanism within the household would not be autonomous. In contrast, changes in the terms of trade would
be endogenous in any detailed analysis of the world economy. In other words, if the terms of trade were
expected to change, a convincing exercise in political economy would found those changes on the state of
the economy, or in other words, on K. And this would mean that   would be autonomous in so far as it
pertains to the terms of trade.
Similar remarks apply to technological change. Improvements in available knowledge are mostly
exogenous to the household. The household can, of course, ride on those changes only if it acquires the
necessary human capital (a component of household capital), but improvements in available knowledge
would not depend on the household's capital base; rather, the household would shape its portfolio of capital
assets in response to the available knowledge and to the anticipated changes in available knowledge. In
contrast, improvements in the knowledge base for the world economy as a whole should be attributable to
research and development. Serendipidy no doubt plays a role, but it has been suggested by scientists that in
research, luck visits only the prepared mind. Recall that in growth accounting, the "residual" is the amount
of growth in output that cannot be attributed to changes in those production inputs that the investigator has
been able to measure. There is no suggestion in the growth literature that if capital assets were
comprehensively accounted for, there would be any residual left. Certainly, the development of endogenous
growth theories was motivated by this viewpoint. In a fully articulated endogenous growth model,   would
be autonomous.
Proposition 2 is a local measure of sustainability. Integrating (13) yields a non-local measure:
Proposition 3. If   is autonomous, then for all T   0,
VT - V0 =  i(piTKiT - pi0Ki0) - 0 
T[ i(dpi /d )Ki ]d . (14)27
Equation (14) shows that in assessing whether or not social welfare has increased between two dates,
the capital gains on the assets that have accrued over the interval should be deducted from the difference in
inclusive wealth between the dates.
Each of Propositions 1, 2 and 3 is an equivalence result. None of the propositions says whether 
gives rise to an economic programme along which social welfare is sustained. For example, it can be that an
economy is incapable of achieving a sustainable development path, owing to scarcity of resources, limited
substitution possibilities among capital assets, or whatever. Or it can be that although the economy is in
principle capable of achieving a sustainable development path, welfare is unsustainable along the path that
has been forecast because of bad government policies. Or it can be that   is optimal, but that because the
welfare discount rate   has been chosen to be large, social welfare is not sustained along the optimum
economic programme. Or it can be that along an optimum path social welfare declines for a period and then
increases thereafter.
Imagine that substitution possibilities are limited, and the resource allocation mechanism in place
is profligate in the use of natural resources. Under these circumstances the quality of life will not be
sustainable. At some date in the future shadow prices will assume such values as to make it impossible for
inclusive wealth to be maintained. As Proposition 2 shows, social welfare declines if inclusive investment
is negative.
6.6 GNP and NNP vs Wealth
GNP is a short term measure of welfare because it does not recognise capital depreciation. In
contrast, inclusive investment is investment net of capital depreciation. We next show that it is possible for
GNP to increase over a period of time even while wealth declines.
Consider the stylised model of a "cake eating" economy, by which we mean an economy where the
rate of return on investment is zero. Imagine that the economic programme that is forecast involves continual
increase in consumption during a finite period [0, T], to be followed by a steady decline to zero. Assume that
it is expected that the entire cake will be consumed over the infinite horizon. If K0 is the initial stock of
"cake", it would follow that
0 
TCtdt + T 
 Ctdt = K0,
where dCt/dt > 0 for t   [0, T] and dCt/dt < 0 for t   [T,  ).
Notice that GNP (equal to consumption) increases at every moment during [0, T], but declines
subsequently. However, wealth (at constant utility price; Proposition 1) is a declining function at each
moment. We therefore have
Proposition 4. GNP could increase for an interval of time even while wealth declines.
Propositions 1-4 provide the basis on which the conflicting intuitions sketched in Section 1.2 have
been held by their respective protagonists.
What of net national product (NNP) as a measure of social welfare? Dasgupta and Heal (1979: Ch.
8) noted that in the cake eating economy NNP is zero all along an optimum consumption programme,
because (i) consumption at each moment equals cake depletion and (ii) the utility price of consumption
equals the utility price of the cake. Since wealth declines along the optimum, there is a dissonance between
the directions of movements in NNP and wealth. In imperfect economies, the dissonance can be even greater.
To confirm, suppose that
U(C) = -C
- ,   > 1. (15)     
33 If   =  / , then from equations (16) and (17) it follows that (NNP)t = 0 at all t.  
     
34 Proposition 5 is familiar for economies where the government maximises intergenerational
welfare (see Arrow and Kurz, 1970).
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Consider the programme {Ct}0
 , where
Ct =  K0e
- t,   > 0. (16)
(It is well known that {Ct}0
  is optimal if   =  / .) The resource allocation mechanism implied by equation
(16) is autonomous. Using equation (16) in equation (15), we have
U (Ct) =  ( Kt)
-( +1). (17)
Expression (17) gives us the shadow price of consumption in utility numeraire.
Assume that   >   . To compute the shadow price of the cake, use equations (8) and (15)-(16) to
obtain,
V(Kt) = -( Kt)
- 
t 
 [e
-( -  )( -t)]d 
      = -( Kt)
- /( -  ),
from which we have
pt = V (Kt) =   
- (Kt)
-( +1)/( -  ). (18)
But NNP at t is,
(NNP)t = (U (Ct) - pt)Ct.
33 (19)
Consider the case    <   < (1+ ) . Then from equations (17) and (18), U (Ct) < pt, implying that (NNP)t
< 0. From equation (16), dCt/dt < 0. Thus, at constant shadow prices, NNP increases at each t. But we know
that, at constant prices, wealth declines along the consumption programme (16). This proves that NNP and
wealth, at constant prices, can move in opposite directions.
6.7 What Else Does Inclusive Investment Measure?
Imagine that the capital base at t is not Kt, but Kt+ Kt, where   is an operator signifying a small
difference. In the obvious notation,
V( , Kt+ Kt) - V( , Kt)   t 
 U (C ) C e
- ( -t)d . (20)
Now suppose that at t there is a small change in  , but only for a brief moment,  t, after which the resource
allocation mechanism reverts back to  . We write the increment in the capital base at t+ t consequent upon
the brief increase in inclusive investment as  Kt. So  Kt is the consequence of an increase in inclusive
investment at t and (Kt+ t +  Kt) is the resulting capital base at t+ t. Let  t tend to zero. From equation (20)
we obtain
Proposition 5. Inclusive investment measures the present discounted value of the changes to consumption
brought about by it.
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6.8 Policy Evaluation
Proposition 5 gives us the tools required to develop a theory of policy evaluation in imperfect
economies. Imagine that even although the government does not optimize, it can bring about small changes
to the economy by altering the existing resource allocation mechanism in minor ways. The perturbation in
question could be small adjustments to the prevailing structure of taxes for a short while, or it could be minor
alterations to the existing set of property rights for a brief period, or it could be a small public investment
project. We call any such perturbation a policy reform.     
35 If the project has been designed efficiently, we would have:
 Yt = ( F/ K) Kt + ( F/ L) Lt + ( F/ R) Rt,
where F is an aggregate production function (Y = F(K,L,R)). The analysis that follows in the text
does not require the project to have been designed efficiently. As we are imagining that aggregate
labour supply is fixed,  Lt used in the project would be the same amount of labour displaced from
elsewhere.
     
36 Dasgupta et al. (1972) and Little and Mirrlees (1974), respectively, developed their accounts
of social cost-benefit analysis with consumption and government income as numeraire. Which
numeraire one chooses is, ultimately, not a matter of principle, but one of practical convenience.
     
37 Thus
qt = t 
 U (C ) C / Rte
- ( -t)d .
Notice that if manufactured capital were to depreciate at a constant rate, say  , the social cost of
borrowing capital would be  t =   +   - (dpt/dt)/pt.
Let qt be the accounting price of the resource in situ. At a full-optimum, pt F/ Rt = qt =
qt, and U (Ct) = pt.
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Consider as an example an investment project. It can be viewed as a perturbation to the resource
allocation mechanism   for a brief period (the lifetime of the project), after which the mechanism reverts
back to its earlier form. We consider projects that are small relative to the size of the economy. How should
they be evaluated?
For simplicity of exposition, we suppose there is a single output, Y (which serves also as the
consumption good), a single manufactured capital good (K), and a single extractive natural resource (S). The
rate of extraction is denoted by R. Let the project's lifetime be the period [0, T]. Denote the project's output
and inputs at t by the vector ( Yt,  Lt,  Kt,  Rt).
35
The project's acceptance would perturb consumption under  . Let the perturbation at t (  0) be  Ct.
It would affect Ut by the amount U (Ct) Ct. However, because the perturbation includes all "general
equilibrium effects", it would be tiresome if the project evaluator were required to estimate  Ct for every
project that came up for consideration. Shadow prices are useful because they enable the evaluator to estimate
 Ct indirectly. Now, it is most unlikely that consumption and investment have the same shadow price in an
imperfect economy. So we divide  Yt into two parts: changes in consumption and in investment in
manufactured capital. Denote them as  Ct and  (dKt/dt), respectively.
U is the unit of account.
36 Let wt denote the accounting wage rate. Next, let pt be the accounting price
of manufactured capital, qt the accounting price of the extractive resource input of the project, and  t the
social cost of borrowing capital (i.e.  t =   - (dpt/dt)/pt).
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From the definition of accounting prices, it follows that
0 
 U (C ) C e
-  d  =
0 
T(U (C ) C +p  (dK /d )-w  L -  p  K -q  R )e
-  d . (21)
But the right hand side of equation (21) is the present discounted value of social profits from the project, in
utility numeraire. Moreover, 0 
 U (C ) C e
-  d  =  V0, the latter being the change in social well-being30
that would be experienced if the project were accepted. We may therefore write equation (21) as,
 V0 = 0 
T(U (C ) C +p  (dK /d )-w  L -  p  K -q  R )e
-  d . (22)
Equation (22) leads to the well-known criterion for project evaluation:
Proposition 6. A project should be accepted if and only if the present discounted value of its social profits
is positive.
Notice the connection between equations (13) and (22): they say the same thing. Proposition 6 brings
out the connection between wealth as a measure of social welfare (Proposition 2) and the present discounted
value of changes in consumption occasioned by a marginal change in inclusive investment (Proposition 5).
Proposition 6 says that the way to evaluate an investment project is to compare reductions in short-term
welfare resulting from the project's investment outlay to the increase in wealth those reductions help to create.
7. Estimating Shadow Prices: Two Examples
Estimating shadow prices requires empirical ingenuity. A prior problem is to derive expressions for
shadow prices that are based on the character of the resource allocation mechanism   and on welfare
parameters. In this section we conduct two exercises to illustrate how shadow prices could be derived. One
involves valuing an open access aquifer, while the other illustrates how shadow prices can be estimated even
when the underlying process is non-convex. We could derive both shadow prices by integrating equation (11)
- the Pontryagin equation. We follow the more intuitive route by working directly with equation (10) instead.
7.1 Open Access Pool
Shadow prices of exhaustible resources in an economy where depletion rates are optimal have been
much studied. What is the structure of their shadow prices when resources are instead common pools?
It is simplest if we avoid a complete capital model. So we resort to a partial equilibrium world:
income effects are assumed to be negligible. Consider then an aquifer that is subject too open access. Let Rt
be the quantity of water extracted at t. Income is the numeraire. Let U(R) be the area under the demand curve
below R. So U (R) is the market demand function. U is assumed to be an increasing and strictly concave
function of R for positive values of R. As before, the discount rate is a constant,  . Let Kt be the stock in the
aquifer at t. Then,
dKt/dt = -Rt. (23)
Let the unit extraction cost of water be a constant m (> 0). Under open access, Hotelling rents are dissipated
completely. Therefore, the equilibrium extraction rate, Rt, is the solution of the equation,
U (Rt) = m. (24)
Equation (24) confirms that, irrespective of the size of the pool, there is excessive extraction. Let R* be the
solution of equation (24). We then have,
dKt/dt = -R*.
Reserves remain positive for a period T = K0/R*. Let us normalize utility by setting U(0) = 0. It follows that,
Vt = t 
(t+K(t)/R*)[U(R*) - mR*]e
- ( -t)d . (25)
Let pt be the shadow price of a unit of water in the aquifer. Then,
pt = dVt/dKt = [(U(R*) - mR*)/R*]exp(- Kt)/R*) > 0. (26)
Write pt* = pt/U (R*), which is the ratio of the shadow price to unit extraction cost. From equations (25)-
(26),
pt* = [(U(R*) - mR*)/mR*]exp(- Kt/R*) > 0. (27)     
38 See also Hartwick and Hageman (1993) for a fine discussion that links El Serafy's formula to
Hicks' formulation of the concept of national income (Hicks, 1942).
     
39 The authors showed that, typically, there are multiple stationary points of the differential
equations that the optimum runoff necessarily satisfies; and that the stationary runoff rate which
ought to be society's long run aim depends on the initial level of phosphorus in the water column.
(See also Keeler et al., 1972.) More interestingly, they showed that the familiar "transversality
condition" in optimum control theory, used in convex optimization problems in conjunction with
the conditions necessary for optimality, is not sufficient: given the initial level of phosphorus in the
water column, the planner would have to compute social welfare along each of the policies that
satisfy the necessary conditions for optimality and tend in the long run to a stationary runoff rate
and compare them. In other words, a non-convex optimization problem, such as this, cannot be
decentralised by means of a system of shadow prices: the planner has to conduct global cost-benefit
analysis. For a pioneering analysis of optimizing a non-convex dynamical system, see Skiba (1978).
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Equation (27) resembles a formula proposed by El Serafy (1989) for estimating depletion charges.
38 The
charge is positive because an extra unit of water in the aquifer would extend the period of extraction. Notice
that pt* is bounded above by the ratio of the Marshallian consumer surplus to total extraction cost. Moreover,
it increases as the aquifer is depleted and attains its upper bound at the date at which the pool is exhausted.
If reserves are large, pt* is small, and open access involves no great loss - a familiar result.
What are plausible orders of magnitude? Consider the linear demand function. Assume therefore that
U(R) = aR - bR
2, a > m and b > 0. (28)
From equations (24) and (28),
R* = (a - m)/2b. (29)
Substituting equations (28) and (29) in equation (27),
pt* = [(a-m)/2m]exp[(-2b Kt)/(a-m)]. (30)
Equation (30) says that
pt*   1 iff  S   [(a-m)/2b]ln[(a-m)/2m].
Equation (30) expresses p* in terms of the parameters of the model. Suppose, for example, that   = 0.02 per
year, K/R* = 100 years (i.e., at the current rate of extraction, the aquifer will be exhausted in 100 years), (a-
m)/2m = 20 (e.g., m = $0.50 and (a-m) = $20). Then p* = 20e
-2   7. We should conclude that the value to
be attributed to water at the margin is high (7 times extraction cost). As the date of exhaustion gets nearer,
the shadow price rises to its upper bound, 20.
7.2 Shadow Price of Phosphorus in a Shallow Lake
Brock and Starrett (2003) have analysed the optimum discharge of phosphorus into the shallow, fresh
water lake we studied in Section 5. Since phosphorus runoff into the lake is a byproduct of agriculture, the
runoff itself is a benefit to society. In the water column of the lake, phosphorus as a stock is beneficial when
the level is low (it is a nutrient for fish), but is deletarious when the level is not low. However, for simplicity,
Brock and Starrett assumed that, as a stock in the water column, phosphorus is a "bad", regardless of its level.
As before, let Ct be the runoff into the lake and Kt the stock in the water column. Brock and Starrett (2003)
assumed the utility function to be of the form,
U(Ct, Kt) = logCt - hKt
2,h  >  0 .
39 (31)
Here, we are interested in an imperfect economy. There are many farmers in the catchments area of
the lake, and they all freely discharge phosphorus into the lake. Shadow prices are useful objects in such a32
world.
Consider a stationary economy, where the total runoff is a constant, C. Recall that the dynamics of
phosphorus stock in the water column is given by the equation
dKt/dt = C + bKt
2/(1+Kt
2) -  Kt,  , b > 0 and K0 (> 0) given. (32)
Imagine that the lake has equilibrated, so that the level of phosphorus in the water column is given by a
solution (see Figures 2 and 4) of
C + bK
2/(1+K
2) -  K = 0. (33)
For concreteness, we consider the case  /b > 1/2. The relevant diagram is Figure 2. Assume C   C* and C
  C**. Let K be that stable solution of equation (33) at which the system has equilibrated. Along this
programme, social welfare (equation (8)) is
V(K) = (logC - hK
2)/ . (34)
Let p(K) be the shadow price of phosphorus in the water column. In order to estimate it, imagine that
at t = 0, K is increased by  0. Since the phosphorus load remains fixed at C (farmers don't care what the state
of the lake is; they only care about farming), the lake returns to K. Let Kt = (K +  t). Linearising the
expression on the left hand side of equation (33) round K (which is a stable equilibrium), it is simple to
confirm that
 t =  0e
- t,   =   - 2bK/(1+K
2)
2 > 0. (35)
But V(K +  0) = (logC)/  - h0 
 (K +  t)
2e
- t,
which, on using equation (35) and ignoring the square of  0, yields 
V(K +  0)   (logC - hK
2)/  - 2hK 0/( + ). (36)
From equations (34) and (36), we conclude that
p(K) = [dV(K)/dK]K=K = -2hK/( + -2bK/(1+K
2)
2) < 0. (37)
Equation (37) is the shadow price of phosphorus in the lake column.
Notice that the above argument wouldn't work at C = C* or C**. V(K) is discontinuous at C** if K
is oligotrophic. (However, it posseses a left-derivative at C**.) Moreover, V(K) is discontinuous at C* if K
is eutrophic. (However, it possesses a right-derivative at C*.) Shadow prices remain useful objects in a non-
convex world, even if the locations of the bifurcation points C* and C** are known with certainty.
8. Extensions
In this section we extend the results that were obtained in Section 6, by considering in turn,
population change, technological and instititutional change, and uncertainty.
8.1 Population Change
How does demographic change affect the index of sustainable development? To answer this, we have
to determine how population change influences the drift term ( Vt/ t) on the right hand side of equation
(12). An alternative is to regard population as a capital asset. Once we do the latter, what would seem to be
a non-autonomous resource allocation mechanism reduces to an autonomous one (Arrow et al., 2003b).
8.1.1 Theory
To illustrate, we adopt a natural extension of Harsanyi (1955), by regarding social welfare to be the
average welfare of all who are ever born. This form of "dynamic average utilitarianism" has been modelled
by Dasgupta (2001a, [2004]) in the following way:     
40 If Nt is a logistic function, n(Nt) = A(N*-Nt), where A and N* are positive constants.
     
41 Notice that the social welfare ordering of economic programmes commencing at t is the same
under dynamic average utilitarianism as it would be under dynamic total utilitarianism (i.e.,
expression (38) without the denominator; as in Mirrlees, 1967, and Arrow and Kurz, 1970). This
is because the denominator is a constant, unaffected by choice of policy at t. However, as criteria
for sustainable development, the formulations differ (Arrow et al., 2003b). This should not be seen
as a paradox: optimality and sustainability are different notions.
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Let Nt be population size at t and n(Nt) the percentage rate of change of Nt.
40 For notational
simplicity, we ignore intragenerational inequality and changes in the age composition of the population. Let
ct denote per capita consumption at t. Therefore, if Ct is aggregate consumption, ct = Ct/Nt. Assume as before
that labour is supplied inelastically in each period. Current utility of the representative person is U(ct) and
social welfare is,
Vt = t 
 N U(c )e
- ( -t)d /t 
 N e
- ( -t)d .
41 (38)
In order to ensure that Vt is well-defined, assume   > 0 
t(n(N )d )/t for large enough t. Let Kit
denote the stock of the ith type of capital good and write kit = Kit/Nt. Let kt be the vector of capital stocks per
head. The state variables are therefore kt and Nt. Assume   to be autonomous. Then equation (38) implies
that
Vt = V(kt,Nt). (39)
Let the numeraire be utility. Define  t =  Vt/ Nt. It is the contribution of an additional person at
t to social welfare.  t is the shadow price of a person (as distinct from the shadow price of a person's human
capital). Let pit denote the shadow price of kit. Differentiating (39) with respect to t gives us
dVt/dt =  ipitdkit/dt +  tdNt/dt. (40)
The right hand side of equation (40) is net investment, inclusive of the value of the change in
population size. It generalizes equation (12). We conclude that Proposition 2 remains valid, so long as wealth
comparisons mean comparisons of wealth per capita, adjusted for demographic changes.
Little is known of the circumstances where the adjustment term ( tdNt/dt) is not negligible, but at
the same time can be estimated in a simple way. It is easy enough, however, to locate conditions under which
the term vanishes. Suppose (i) n(Nt) is independent of Nt; (ii) all the production processes are linear; and (iii)
ct = c(kt), which means that under  , per capita consumption is not a function of population size. In such
circumstances Vt = V(kt); that is, it is independent of Nt. (Effects of population change on V work through
capital assets per capita.) This means that
dVt/dt =  ipitdkit/dt. (41)
The finding can be summarised as
Proposition 7: If (i) n(Nt) is independent of Nt, (ii) all the production processes are linear, and (iii) ct = c(kt),
then social welfare is sustained at a point in time if and only if the shadow value of the changes in per capita
capital assets at that instant is non-negative.
8.1.2 Application
The conditions underlying Proposition 7 are too strong for comfort. Nevertheless, it is tempting to
use equation (41) as a first approximation to equation (40). A large number of village level studies in South
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa have uncovered that the local natural resource base has declined amidst growing     
42 See, for example, the references in footnote 6.
     
43 What we are calling inclusive investment was called "genuine saving" by Hamilton and
Clemens.
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populations in what continue to remain, broadly speaking, biomass-based economies.
42 Wealth per capita
in those villages would appear to have declined. But what about the national level? Even if a nation's natural
resource base were to decline, its wealth per capita would increase if the decline were more than compensated
by increases in manufactured and human capital.
Dasgupta (2001a, [2004]) used Proposition 7, on data provided by Hamilton and Clemens (1999),
in order to assess whether the world's poorest regions have enjoyed sustainable development in the recent
past. The regions considered were sub-Saharan Africa, China, and the countries of the Indian sub-continent
(South Asia). Taken together, those regions are inhabited by more than 3 billion people and are home to the
bulk of the world's 1 billion poorest. They are also among the regions that have experienced the largest
growth in population in recent decades.
Hamilton and Clemens (1999) had offered estimates of annual inclusive investment during the period
1970-1993 for a large number of countries.
43 There is much awkwardness in the steps the authors took to
arrive at estimates of shadow prices. Their accounts are also incomplete. For example, among the resources
making up natural capital, only commercial forests, oil and minerals, and the atmosphere as a sink for carbon
dioxide were included. Not included were fresh water, forests as agents of carbon sequestration, fisheries,
air and water pollutants, soil, and biodiversity. So there is an undercount, possibly a serious one. Such
failings, however, are to be expected in pioneering empirical work. Moreover, one has to start somewhere.
In their work on the sources of national economic growth during 1965-1994, Collins and Bosworth
(1996) had found the "residual" to have been -0.6 percent per year in sub-Saharan Africa, 0.8 percent per year
in South Asia, and 1.1 percent per year in East Asia. If we interpret the residual to represent exogenous
changes in knowledge and institutions, its influence on movements in social welfare (Proposition 1) would
be reflected in the drift term ( Vt/ t) in equation (12). Nevertheless, Dasgupta (2001a, [2004]) assumed
 Vt/ t to have been zero in those regions. The justification he offered was that the figures for inclusive
investment in Hamilton and Clemens (1999) are in all probability significant underestimates, and that figures
for the residual in Collins and Bosworth (1996) - low as they are in South Asia - are nevertheless likely to
be overestimates (see Section 8.2).
The first column of figures in the accompanying table (taken from Dasgupta, 2001a, [2004])
provides annual rates of growth of population over the period 1965-96 in the countries and regions in
question. Notice that all but China experienced rates of growth in excess of 2 percent a year, sub-Saharan
Africa and Pakistan having grown in numbers at nearly 3 percent a year. The second column of the table
contains estimates of annual rates of change in wealth per head during 1970-1993. The striking message is
that in all but China there was a decumulation in per capita wealth. Moreover, comparing the figures in the
first two columns, it may be infered that during the period in question, Bangladesh and Nepal became poorer
in the aggregate, not just on a per capita basis. In contrast, the other regions accumulated wealth in the
aggregate. However, wealth accumulation did not keep pace with population growth in India, Pakistan, and
sub-Saharan Africa. All this may not be a surprise in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, which is widely known35
to have regressed in terms of most economic indicators; but the figures for Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and
Pakistan should cause surprise. Only China has accumulated wealth in excess of population growth.
However, since the Hamilton-Clemens estimates of net investment do not include soil erosion or urban
pollution, both of which are thought by experts to be especially problematic in China, the figure for China
could be an overestimate. On the other hand, the residual in China was not negligible: in excess of 1 percent
per year. So it is unclear in which direction a bias has been created in the estimate for China by the neglect
of the drift term ( Vt/ t) in equation (12).
It should be emphasised that negative figures for changes in wealth per capita over time in South
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa do not signal that people in those regions have been consuming too much! In
imperfect economies it is possible to raise both consumption and inclusive investment.
How do changes in per capita inclusive wealth compare with changes in conventional measures of
economic welfare? The third column of the table contains figures for the rate at which GNP per head changed
during 1965-96; and the fourth column records whether the change in the United Nations' Human
Development Index (HDI) over the period 1970-1995 was positive or negative.
Notice that our assessment of long-term economic development in the Indian sub-continent would
be misleading if we were to rely on growth rates in per capita GNP as the index of development. Pakistan,
for example, would be seen as a country where GNP per head grew at a healthy 2.7 percent a year, implying
that the index doubled in value between 1965 and 1993. The corresponding figure in the second column
implies though that the average Pakistani became poorer by a factor of about 1.5 during that same period.
Bangladesh is recorded as having grown in terms of per capita GNP at 1 percent a year during 1965-
1996. The figure in the second column of the table implies that at the end of the period the average
Bangladeshi was only about half as wealthy as she was at the beginning.
The case of sub-Saharan Africa is of course especially depressing. At an annual rate of decline of
2 percent in wealth per capita, the average person in the region became poorer by nearly a factor of two. The
ills of sub-Saharan Africa are routine reading in today's newspapers and magazines, but the ills are not
depicted in terms of a decline in wealth. The table suggests that sub-Saharan Africa has experienced a
substantial decline in its capital assets over the past three decades.
What of the Human Development Index (HDI)? As the second and fourth columns of the table show,
HDI offers a picture that is a near opposite to the one we should obtain when judging the performance of poor
countries. The Human Development Index misleads even more than GNP.
The figures in the table for changes in wealth per capita are rough and ready and one should not
regard them with anything like the certitude that we have developed over the years for international statistics
on GNP and the demographic and morbidity statistics of poor countries. The estimates reported in the table
are a first cut at what is an enormously difficult set of exercises. But the figures, such as they are, show how
accounting for Nature can make for substantial differences to our conception of the processes of economic
development.
8.2 Technological and Institutional Change
In a more comprehensive investigation, Arrow et al. (2004) have derived a procedure for converting
figures for the residual into figures for the drift term ( Vt/ t) on the right hand side of equation (12). The
authors used data on inclusive investment published in World Bank (2002) and estimates of the residual in
the world's poorest regions, the Middle East, and the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) from36
Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), to arrive at figures for the average annual rate of change in wealth per
capita, at constant prices, during the period 1970-2001.
As noted earlier, the residual was in fact negative in sub-Saharan Africa, a reflection of institutional
regress there. Consistent with Dasgupta's finding, Arrow et al. (2004) found that social welfare declined in
sub-Saharan Africa during the period in question. They showed that the Middle East also experienced a
decline in social welfare, owing in large measure to a decline in their oil wealth, unmatched by the
accumulation of human capital and foreign assets. The US and UK were found to have enjoyed a growth in
social welfare: the drift term ( Vt/ t) was positive and wealth per capita had increased in both countries.
China was found to have enjoyed a huge annual percentage increase in wealth per capita (over 7 percent per
year), the contribution of the drift term being enormous. The authors found that Bangladesh and Pakistan had
experienced a small annual decline in wealth per capita during 1970-2001; but, encouragingly, they found
that India and Nepal had enjoyed a small increase in social welfare (about 0.5 percent per year). The latter
finding is at variance with the corresponding estimates in Dasgupta (2001a, [2004]), which, as we noted in
Section 8.1, had found a decline in social welfare there. There are two reasons why the findings in Dasgupta
(2001a, [2004]) differ from those in Arrow et al. (2004). First, the former publication ignored the residual,
whereas the latter incorporated it in their estimate; and second, the periods under study were not the same
in the two studies. In any event, the fact that one neglected the residual, while the other included it, can be
regarded as constituting a sensitivity analysis of the recent macroeconomic history of South Asia.
This said, the figures for growth in wealth per capita in Arrow et al. (2004) are most likely to be
over-estimates. To see why, recall that the typical exercise in growth accounting postulates that aggregate
output (Y) is a function of manufactured capital (K), labour force participation (L), and human capital (H).
One specification would be
Yt = AtF(Kt, HtLt), (42)
where At is a scale factor, reflecting total factor productivity, while F is a constant returns to scale function
of K and HL (perhaps even of the Cobb-Douglas form).
Differentiating both sides of equation (42) with respect to time, re-arranging terms, and writing by
g(Xt) = (dXt/dt)/Xt for variable Xt; by Jt = HtLt; by sK = KtFK/F (the "share" of factor K in aggregate output);
and by sJ = JtFJ/F (the "share" of factor J in aggregate output); we have
g(Yt) = g(At) + sKg(Kt) + sJ(g(Ht) + g(Lt)). (43)
The idea now is to obtain time series of g(Yt), sKg(Kt), and sJ(g(Ht) + g(Lt)) and then to arrive at an estimate
of g(At) from equation (43). g(At) is the residual.
One problem with the function F in expression (42) is that it leaves out the flow of Nature's services
in production. Admittedly, ecosystem services are hard to estimate, but energy use could be used as a
surrogate. Now suppose that the use of Nature's services in production has increased over a period. That
increase would be missing from the latter two terms on the right hand side of equation (43). Therefore, it
would be regarded as being a part of the residual. But this would be more than just ironic: a nation could in
principle step up the rate at which its natural resources are mined and then claim on the basis of its growth
accounts that the figures reflect increases in technological progress and improvements in its institutions!
8.3 Uncertainty
How should uncertainty be accommodated? The theory of choice under uncertainty, in its normative
guise, remains the expected-utility theory. There is a large and still-growing experimental literature attesting37
to the fact that in laboratory conditions people don't choose in accordance with the theory (Bell et al., 1988).
But here we are concerned with normative questions. That the choices we make in the laboratory don't
conform to expected utility theory does not mean that the theory is not the correct ethical basis for evaluating
policy alternatives or assessing where or not the economic programme being pursued reflects sustainable
development.
When applied to the valuation of uncertain consumption programmes, probabilities are imputed to
future events. The probabilities are taken to be subjective, such as those involving long-range climate,
although there can be objective components. Let Et denote expectations at t. Assume that population is
constant. Recalling expression (8), social welfare can then be expressed as,
V(Kt) = Et(t 
 U(C ( ))e
- ( -t)d ). (44)
A deficiency in the figures for changes in wealth reported in Section 8.1 is that they are point estimates.
However, given that there are vast uncertainties associated with any such estimate, there is the possibility that
changes in wealth per capita have been negative even though the central estimates themselves are positive.
In considering the risks associated with degradation of natural capital, it is worth recalling that the
biophysical impacts of such degradation can be highly nonlinear: the impacts could be small over a
considerable range, but then become immense once a critical threshold is reached. As we noted in the
extended example in Section 5, crossing the threshold leads to a bifurcation, where the natural system's
characteristics change fundamentally. Such non-convexities in ecological processes imply that the
distribution for changes in wealth per capita may be highly skewed - the downside risks associated with the
loss of certain forms of natural capital may be substantial. Estimates of changes in per capita wealth reported
in Sections 8.1.2 may be interpreted as representing the most-likely scenario; therefore, they do not capture
the downside risks associated with the depletion of natural capital. To the extent that societies are risk-averse,
it is important to award additional weight to the negative scenarios. Doing so would imply lower estimates
of changes in per capita wealth.
Models of global climate indicate that bifurcations can occur if the rates and magnitude of
greenhouse gases increase sufficiently. However, the threshold points are not known. It is clear from
paleoclimatic history, though, that such events were common. Mastrandrea and Schneider (2001) have
employed a linked climate-economy model to investigate the future possibilities of climate thresholds of this
type, and have assessed the implications for climate policy.
Uncertainties regarding environmental events in the very distant future are sometimes called "deep"
uncertainties, the qualification being taken to mean that it may not be possible to assign even subjective
probabilities to those events. This is another way of saying that when there are deep uncertainties, it is
difficult to know what one should choose, or how one should organise one's thoughts regarding what to
choose. Examples frequently mentioned are risks associated with global climate change. There are decision
theories (e.g., Bewley, 1989) that offer reasons why we ought to be reluctant to undertake activities involving
unestimable risks. They suggest that the status-quo should assume a favoured status, which is the hallmark
of what many refer to as the precautionary principle (e.g., Appell, 2001), frequently espoused by
environmentalists. Such theories would appeal to someone who feels that it is easier to prevent environmental
damage than to repair it subsequently. The theory gives expression to the demand that, in evaluating radically
new technology (e.g., biotechnology), the burden of proof ought to shift away from those who advocate
protection from environmental damage, to those supporting the new technology.     
44 The disagreement is mirrored in popular writings. See, for example, McNeil (2000) and The
Economist ("Environmental Scares: Plenty of Gloom", 20 December 1997) for differing
perspectives. For commentaries on the latter article by a group of ecologists and economists, see
the symposium in Environment and Development Economics, 1998, Vol. 3, Part 4.
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The problem with such theories is that they are supremely conservative. Admittedly, even expected
utility theory can be made ultra-conservative if we adopt an infinite aversion to risk - which is to say that the
elasticity of U (C) in expression (8) is infinity - and imagine that the worst that can happen under any
change in policy is worse than the worst that can happen under the status-quo. But it is difficult to justify
such an attitude: we wouldn't adopt it even in our personal lives. At the moment we don't have a theory,
normative or otherwise, that covers long-term environmental uncertainties in a satisfactory way.
9. Concluding Remarks
In this article we have surveyed those recent developments in environmental and resource economics
that have been prompted by a puzzling cultural phenomenon of recent years: one group of scientists (usually
natural scientists) sees in humanity's current use of Nature's services symptoms of a deep malaise, even while
another group of scientists (usually economists) documents the fact that people today are on average better
off in many ways than they had ever been (so why the gloom?).
44 The developments surveyed here have
reconciled some of the claims and counter claims, by showing that the warring protagonists have frequently
talked past one another. We do not wish to suggest that disagreements between the two groups will not arise
once they adopt the technical vocabulary recently developed by environmental and resource economists; but
the disagreements that would continue to arise would be over interpretations of evidence (e.g., about the costs
and benefits of doing something today about global warming), they would not be over what to disagree
about!
9.1 Shadow Prices and Wealth Estimates in National Accounts
By reconstructing welfare indicators to account for our use of natural resources, recent developments
in environmental and resource economics have seen an enlargement of the scope of both micro- and macro-
economic reasoning. Extending modern welfare economics, it has been shown that discussions on
intergenerational welfare should be about institutions and policies that bring about changes and movements
in wealth, where by an economy's wealth we mean the social worth of its entire set of capital assets,
including not only manufactured and human capital, but also knowledge and natural capital. Estimates of
movements in wealth per capita in a number of countries and regions since the early 1970s were reported
in Section 8. They suggest that, while industrialised countries, such as the United States and the United
Kingdom, have accumulated wealth per capita, sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East have suffered a
decline. The Indian sub-continent would appear to be a border-line case. But these are early days, and much
more work needs to be done toward estimating shadow prices and using them for the preparation of
comprehensive capital accounts before we can be reasonably confident of the recent macroeconomic history
of South Asia.
We are under no illusion that estimating wealth is going to prove a simple task. Markets for
environmental natural resources are often at best imperfect, at worst are non-existent. But that stricture offers
no ground for pretending that natural capital is in infinite supply. To pretend thus, while refining the ways
GNP is estimated so as to better record the progress of nations, is to be the proverbial man in the dark,     
45 Tilman and Kareiva (1997) is an excellent collection of articles on spatial ecological
dynamics.
     
46 Kremer (1993) develops such a model to account for 1 million years of world economic
history. 
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seeking to retrieve his keys from under the lamp post even while knowing full well that they are not there.
9.2 Poverty and the Natural Resource Base
The developments in environmental and resource economics surveyed here have also offered us a
language in which to study rural economies in the world's poorest regions. Aggregate statistics at the national
level can suppress information pertaining to local natural resource bases. Modern environmental and resource
economics has shown that the intellectual disputes among those economists who see signs of economic
betterment in increases in GNP per head (or improvements in the United Nations' Human Development
Index) and those who see the persistence of acute poverty in large parts of the poor world have arisen in part
because the protagonists have talked past one another. In Section 4 we reported recent work on village
economies and on the importance of the local resource base there. We found that the study of village based,
non-market institutions can help to explain how certain groups of people may remain in poverty (possibly
even suffer a worsening in their circumstances), even while others thrive as markets grow elsewhere. The
spatial character of ecosystems (and thence, of rural economies) was stressed. The findings suggest that there
is much scope for further work in the ways in which the spatial heterogeneity of natural capital affects the
prospects facing rural economies.
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9.3 Growth Theories and Resource Constraints
Contemporary models of economic growth are by and large dismissive of the importance of Nature.
In their extreme form, growth models assume a positive link between the creation of ideas (technological
progress) and population growth in a world where the natural-resource base comprises a fixed, indestructible
factor of production. The models do involve positive feedback, but of a Panglossian kind.
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There is a great deal to commend in contemporary growth models, but recent developments in
environmental and resource economics suggest that we should be circumspect in our enthusiasm for them.
Nature is not fixed and indestructible, but consists of degradable resources (agricultural soil, watersheds,
fisheries, and sources of fresh water; more generally, ecological services). It may be sensible to make the
wrong assumption for studying a period when natural resource constraints did not bite, but it may not be
sensible when studying development possibilities in poor countries today. The latter move would be
especially suspect if no grounds were offered for supposing that technological progress can be depended
upon indefinitely to more than substitute for an ever increasing loss of the natural-resource base. Moreover,
as was noted in Sections 1-4, ecological resources are frequently underpriced. This means that the direction
of technological change is biased toward an excessive reliance on the natural resource base. As that base
shrinks, it may prove harder and harder to find ways of substituting our way out of the problem of resource
scarcity.
In any event, it is not prudent to adopt a point of view that places such enormous burden on an
experience not much more than two hundred and fifty years old. Extrapolation into the past is a sobering
exercise: over the long haul of history (a 5,000 years stretch, say, upto about two hundred years ago),     
47 See Fogel (1994), Johnson (2000), and especially Maddison (2001). The claim holds even if
the past two hundred years were to be included. Here is a rough calculation: World per capita output
today is about 5000 US dollars. The World Bank regards one dollar a day to be about as bad as it
can be. People wouldn't be able to survive on anything substantially less than that. It would then
be reasonable to suppose that 2000 years ago per capita income was not much less than a dollar a
day. So, let us assume that it was a dollar a day. This would mean that per capita income 2000 years
ago was about 350 dollars a year. Rounding off numbers, this means, very roughly speaking, that
per capita income has risen about 16 times since then. This in turn means that world income per
head has doubled every 500 years, which in its turn means that the average annual rate of growth
has been about 0.14 percent per year, a figure not much in excess of zero, which is what we have
alluded to in the text.
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economic growth even in the currently-rich countries was for most of the time not much above zero.
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The foregoing remarks bear on the aggregate economy. At a more micro level, we noted in Sections
3-5 that positive feedback in ecological (including individual metabolic) pathways are reasons why the
prospects of economic betterment among the world's poorest are bleaker than among the rich. The non-
convexities the poor face can be a reflection of their inability to obtain substitutes for depleted natural
resources. Resource depletion for the poor can be like crossing a threshold: their room for maneouver is
circumscribed hugely once they cross. In contrast, the rich can usually "substitute" their way out of problems.
The simultaneous presence of two types of positive feedback - one enabling many to move up in
their living standard, the other keeping many others in poverty - may explain the large scale persistence of
absolute poverty in a world that has been growing wealthier on average by substituting manufactured and
human capital for natural capital. For human well-being, policies matter, as do institutions, but the local
ecology matters too. If we have stressed the positive feedback mechanisms that operate at the downside of
life, it is because degradation of the natural-resource base is felt first by the poor, not the rich.41
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Economic Change: 1970-93
____________________________________________________________________________
g(L)
a  g(W/L)
b g(Y/L)
c  (HDI)
d
 
____________________________________________________________________________
Bangladesh       2.3 -2.40   1.0 +ve
India  2.1 -0.50 2.3 +ve
Nepal       2.4 -2.60 1.0 +ve
Pakistan  2.9 -1.70 2.7 +ve
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.7 -2.00 -0.2 +ve
China  1.7   1.09 6.7 +ve 
___________________________________________________________________________
a g(L): average annual percentage rate of growth of population, 1965-96.
b g(W/L): average annual percentage rate of change in wealth per head at constant prices. Adapted from
Hamilton and Clemens (1999) and from data provided in personal communication by Katie Bolt of the World
Bank.
c g(Y/L): average annual percentage rate of change in GNP per head, 1965-96.
d  (HDI): sign of change in the United Nations' Human Development Index, 1970-1995.
Source. Dasgupta (2001a, [2004]).